INTRODUCTION
1. My name is A. W. Richard Sipe. I am a
psychotherapist and psychiatrist assistant in the state of Maryland. I was
professed as a Benedictine monk in 1953 and ordained a Roman Catholic priest in
1959. I retired from religious life and the priesthood with the permission of
Rome in 1970. I have spent 37 years as a counselor, psychotherapist, and teacher
of Catholic clerics and a counselor and psychotherapist to lay Catholics with a
history of sexual involvement with Catholic priests and religious.
2. I have been asked to review numerous documents
and depositions in the cases styled: John Doe I vs. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Dallas, et al, Cause No. 93—09441-G, John Doe II & III vs. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Dallas, et al, Cause No. 94-07864-G, John Doe IV vs. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Dallas, et al, Cause No. 94-10091-G, John Doe I- XI v. Rudolph Kos,
et al, Cause No. 93-05258-G, and Jane Doe I vs. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Dallas, et al, Cause No. 94-07865-G. These documents and depositions have
included the personnel files of Fr. Robert R. Peebles, Jr., Fr. William Hughes,
and Fr. Rudolph Kos; the laicization file of Fr. Peebles; medical records
regarding Fr. Peebles and Fr. Kos; and numerous documents and depositions,
including depositions of the claimants, their families, and others in these
cases. As a result of my review of the basic documents and discovery; and my
background, training, experience, and research, I have arrived at a number of
opinions which are outlined in this report regarding the various parties in
these cases. I understand that discovery, especially as to the Bishops
Conference and the Military Vicariate/AMS is not complete. Nevertheless, I have
been asked to submit a preliminary report of my opinions and conclusions based
on the information available to me at this time.
Back to Top of Report
BACKGROUND/
EXPERIENCE/RESEARCH
3. After I was ordained in 1959 my first
assignment was as a teacher and counselor in a parish high school. This
assignment was my first introduction to parish life and the secret world of
sexual activity on the part of some Catholic priests and religious despite vows
of celibacy and chastity. I became immediately aware of sexual activity by
priests and religious with both minors and adults. This revelation to me of a
secret system concealing the lack of celibate practice among some Catholic
priests and religious prompted my interest in counseling Catholic priests and
religious. My work and research —which continues through the present
time — expanded to include celibate/sexual practice of Catholic priests and
its effect on lay adults and children. This research, experience, and
observation form the basis for my opinions in these cases.4. In 1964 I received
a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health and the Danforth Foundation
to study pastoral counseling for one year at the Menninger Foundation.
5. From 1965 through 1967 I received a fellowship
to study counseling and psychotherapy of Catholic priests and religious at Seton
Psychiatric Institute, a Catholic-owned and operated hospital in Baltimore,
Maryland. Seton Psychiatric Institute was established in 1844 and was the
leading mental health facility in the United States for the treatment of
Catholic priests and religious. Thousands of priests and religious from around
the United States were referred by their bishops or religious superiors for
treatment at Seton Institute for various psychiatric problems.
6. In 1967 I was hired at Seton Institute to head
the Department of Family Services. I held this position until 1970 when I
retired. From 1965 to 1970 I was involved in in-take conferences regarding each
new patient, including numerous Catholic priests and religious who were referred
to Seton to avoid criminal prosecution for sexual involvement with minors. Seton
closed in 1972.
7. In the early 1950s, St. John s University,
Collegeville, Minnesota established its Institute for Mental Health. This
institute brought together prominent psychologists, psychiatrists,
psychoanalysts, and Catholic clergy from all over the United States and,
ultimately, nine foreign countries. I was Executive Director of the Institute
from September 1, 1965 to August 30, 1969 (ancillary to my fellowship and
employment at Seton). I spent to 4-10 days per month at St. John s. In addition
to 4—5 weeks each summer supervising workshops. During this time I was also
designated personnel director of a 350 member religious community. St. John s
was the premier Catholic facility in the United States for promoting the
interaction between psychiatry and clergy. St. John s sponsored numerous
one—week programs each year involving six psychiatrists and 40 clergymen of
all faiths, although the largest proportion were Catholic priests and bishops.
The psychoanalytic dimensions of problems involving clergy were frequently
discussed in detail. Issues involving the sexual involvement of Catholic clergy
with minors were a also a topic of conversation at these weekly programs,
especially during staff conferences where the clinicians shared their
experiences and case histories.
8. I have taught at three Catholic major
seminaries — one of which is a Pontifical seminary - from September 1, 1967
through June 30, 1984. I continue to give lectures on how to achieve celibate
practice at Catholic seminaries, most recently from January 7 to 22, 1996. In
April 1996, I published a manual for those who wish to practice a celibate
lifestyle — Celibacy: A Way of Loving, Living, and Serving. 9. I have been
associated with a number of treatment facilities other than the Menninger
Foundation and Seton Psychiatric Hospital. These include service on the Board of
Directors of St. Luke Institute from 1986-1988 where both Fr. Rudy Kos and Fr.
Robert Peebles were evaluated; Taylor Manor Hospital where I served on the
advisory board; and the North Baltimore Mental Health Center where I served on
the staff.
10. I hold an appointment at John s Hopkins
University Medical School, Department of Psychiatry, as an instructor
(part—time) from 1972 to the present time.
11. I lectured and supervised the psychiatric
fellows in the Child and Adolescent program at Johns Hopkins University Medical
School, Department of Psychiatry, from 1989-1993.
12. Beginning with my association with Seton
Institute in 1965, I worked closely with experienced psychiatrists and
psychoanalysts including my mentor, Dr. Leo Bartemeier, who had consulted with
Catholic bishops and religious superiors for decades. I became acquainted with
numerous case histories of Catholic priests and religious involving sexual
activities with minors extending back to 1917. In 1965 Catholic bishops and
religious superiors knew that sexual involvement with minors was a problem for
some priests and religious. This topic will be explored in greater detail in
other sections of my report.
13. Over the five year period of my association
with Seton psychiatric hospital, I was personally aware of numerous formal and
informal consultations with Catholic bishops and religious superiors from across
the United States who were concerned about sexual activity of Catholic clerics
with minors. The customary practice in Catholic dioceses and congregations
across the United States when complaints of abuse were made was to transfer the
priest out of his current position into another position of clerical service
unless the situation came to the attention of civil authorities or threatened
grave scandal. In these cases, the priests or religious were sent to a treatment
facility, such as Seton, in order to avoid criminal prosecution and/or public
exposure. In virtually all referrals to Seton Institute for sexual contact
involving minors, the precipitating event was usually either a risk of public
exposure or a court—related referral.
14. My research began in 1960 as the study of
celibacy, and consequently, sexual activity of Catholic priests and religious;
and my work continues as an effort to understand that dynamic. From this study,
I was able to distinguish sexual activity with minors as a significant and
unique sexual problem that involved repetitive behavior with multiple minors
which resulted in tremendous negative consequences to the emotional health of
the minor participant. This non-celibate behavior is radically different from
sexual involvement with an age-appropriate partner which can lead to stable and
consensual relationships. The Catholic cleric who was involved with minors
generally had an age range of attraction which the minor eventually exceeded.
The sexual acting out of the cleric also tended to be compulsive. These
conclusions were apparent to me in the mid 1970s.
15. Dr. Leo Bartemeier cooperated with me in this
work and research from 1964 through 1978. Based on our research work, our
experience with patients, victims, religious superiors, and reports from
colleagues , we estimated in 1976 that six per cent (6%) of all Catholic clerics
acted out sexually with minors .
16. Over the years I have had a therapist/patient
or consultative relationship with over 1,000 Catholic clerics and over 500
persons with whom Catholic clerics have acted out sexually. I have conducted
extensive research, counseling, interviews and reviews of case histories of
2,700 sexually active clerics and 2,000 victims of sexual abuse by Catholic
clerics.
17. My research and observation of sexual
dynamics in the Catholic clergy has been national in scope, involving men and
women from numerous dioceses and congregations. I have had broad national
contact with Catholic clergy on the issue of mental health and pastoral care.
This contact has included training programs on how to observe mental health
problems in clergy. Five dioceses and five religious congregations were
Particularly helpful in establishing the baseline for our estimates of
sexual/celibate behavior of priests. While the specific individuals,
dioceses-and congregations must remain confidential, we have used this research
to verify our estimates and validate our opinions regarding the national picture
of celibate practice among Catholic clerics, the extent of sexual involvement
with minors, and efforts to conceal these facts from the public. My estimates of
clergy sexual misconduct with both minors and adults are, in my opinion,
conservative.
18. After I was ordained in 1959, I learned that
some priests had sex with adults and even minors, and to some degree this
behavior was taken for granted by church authorities. Yet, an atmosphere of
crisis regarding this issue did not exist. The secret world of sexual activity,
including sexual activity with minors, was known by the Catholic hierarchy, and
though considered unfortunate and morally wrong, was accepted as an inevitable
and easily forgivable failure of some priests. The atmosphere of crisis did not
develop until years later when occurrences of sexual activity with minors became
publicly discussed. Prior to wide—spread public acknowledgment, victims of
abuse were silent and isolated. The primary objective of the Catholic hierarchy
was avoiding scandal.
Back to Top of Report
FIRST PHASE: THE
INTERFACE OF PSYCHIATRY/PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEMS OF CATHOLIC CLERICS
19. When I entered the priesthood, the sexual
activities of supposedly celibate priests and religious was kept from the public
by a closed system which I have referred to as the "celibate/sexual
system." Clerics in a position of responsibility within the Church would be
aware of sexual activity by Catholic clergy, including sexual activity with
minors, because as bishop/superior/vicar, they were aware of complaints and
would have to deal with problems as they arose. In the late 1950s and early
1960s, when knowledge left the closed system it entered into the psychiatric
system. Psychiatry and psychology were used to treat the offending cleric,
contain scandal, and to placate the legal system if the cleric ran afoul of the
law. Victims and their families were usually reassured by Church authorities and
subsequently ignored. "Father is our problem and we will take care of the
problem."
20. For the next 8-10 years, sexual problems of
Catholic clergy were subsumed under the umbrella of other psychiatric problems,
especially alcoholism. In fact, alcoholism was the first to be separated out and
differentiated as a specific disorder afflicting clergy. (See article in
Saturday Evening Post, circa 1953, and review the establishment of special
alcohol treatment centers for priests.) Instances of sexual acting out were
often causally related by history to excessive drinking .
21. Over time, psychosexual disorders were
differentiated from alcoholism, depression, schizophrenia, and characterological
disorders. This does not mean that the term "pedophilia" (and
particularly not the term "ephebophilia") was in common usage.
Certainly by 1976, the problem of Catholic clergy sexually acting out with
minors was recognized as a serious mental illness.
22. The first public discussion of priest sexual
abuse of minors was at a meeting sponsored by the National Association for
Pastoral Renewal held on the campus of Notre Dame University in 1967. All
American Catholic bishops were invited to that meeting.
23. In 1968 the newly formed National Conference
of Catholic Bishops authorized a series of investigations of the priesthood in
the United States which were published in 1972. These studies included
Historical Investigations, Sociological Investigations, and Psychological
Investigations. These investigations were quite detailed and extensive. I knew
several of the consultants who were involved in the studies, including several
who were associated with the Seton Institute and were professional colleagues of
mine. These included Ivan Junk, M.D., Sara Charles, M.D., Marianne Benkert,
M.D., and Leo Bartemeier, M.D. Fr. Eugene Kennedy, who was conducting the
psychological study, was a frequent visitor to the Seton Institute .
24. The NCCB/USCC study concluded that 1/3rd of
Catholic priests in the United States were under-developed emotionally, 1/3rd
were developing, and 1/3rd were developed. These studies validated my
observation of the emotional health and development of the priests and religious
I had observed and treated at Menninger and Seton and in my therapeutic work and
studies.
25. In 1977 an additional study, also by Fr.
Eugene Kennedy, found that 57% of Catholic priests were underdeveloped, 29% were
developing, 8% were maldeveloped, and only 6% were developed emotionally.
Back to Top of Report
SECOND PHASE: THE
ADVENT OF REPORTING LAWS
26. The secret system concealing sexual
activities with minors on the part of Catholic priests and religious was first
impacted in 1962 when the first reporting laws were passed. By 1968 virtually
all states had reporting laws. In 1974 federal legislation mandating the
existence of reporting laws in each state was passed. This does not mean that
such offenses were reported or that Church authorities were mandated reporters
in each state.
27. Although statutes had been passed in the
1930s and 40s criminalizing sexually acting out with minors, these laws were
rarely activated until many years after the passage of statutes mandating the
reporting of suspected sexual misconduct with minors.
28. The 1974 federal legislation which made
reporting laws a mandatory requirement for the receipt of federal aid was
significant to my practice. For the first time, this put pressure on psychiatry
and psychology because it was the first outside intrusion into the
confidentiality of the therapist/ patient relationship.
29. In 1976 the rise of the duty to report
suspected sexual activity with children prompted Dr. Leo Bartemeier and myself
to evaluate all of our available information in order to quantify the scope of
the problem within the Catholic clergy. Dr. Bartemeier had been extensively
involved in consultation with Church authorities since the late 1920s. Taking
all of the available data into consideration led to our estimate that 6% of all
Catholic clergy and religious acted out sexually with minors.
30. At the time Dr. Bartemeier and I made these
estimates, the terms pedophilia and ephebophilia were not in common use and the
official diagnostic manual for mental disorders saw them as part of an overall
personality disturbance. This did not mean that professionals in the field and
Catholic bishops and religious superiors were unaware of the behavior; it was
simply referred to as sexual activity with minors.
31. In 1976, my specialty for 12 years had been
counseling with Catholic priests and religious. I was also counseling with
numerous lay patients who reported sexual involvement with Catholic clergy. The
above estimate was an effort on the part of myself and Dr. Bartemeier to
understand the scope of the problem.
32. In my years as a counselor and
psychotherapist I have never treated both a priest and his minor victim. I have
also taken care not to advise or treat priests or their minor victims if I had a
conflicting relationship with the Diocese or congregation. In some instances I
have treated a priest and his adult sexual partner with their consent.
Back to Top of Report
THIRD PHASE: THE
FUSION OF PSYCHIATRY/PSYCHOLOGY AND THE OPENING OF CATHOLIC TREATMENT CENTERS
33. In the early the 1950s, Fr. Bier a Jesuit
from Fordham University advocated psychological testing of candidates for the
priesthood to eliminate problem priests, including those who acted out sexually.
Fr. Bier s writings and advocacy of the use of screening tests reflected a
growing awareness within the Catholic church that sexual behaviors by men
professing celibacy were not merely expectable spiritual problems but contained
psychological components as well.
34. Previously, if a priest had sex or fell in
love these were considered ordinary and expectable moral/spiritual problems. The
growing recognition of the psychological dimension of such moral/spiritual
problems coincided with the opening of Catholic treatment centers, with the
Jesuits training nine priest-psychiatrists within the U. S. Provinces, and the
opening of training programs for novice masters and spiritual directors which
took into account the psychological dimension of moral/spiritual problems.
35. In my own order, Thomas Verner Moore was the
first Benedictine priest/psychiatrist. Fr. Moore founded the Department of
Psychiatry at the Catholic University of America in the 1940s. Catholic
University was the only university with a Department of Psychiatry without a
medical school.
36. The second Benedictine priest/psychiatrist
was Fr. Hayden who founded the Marselan Institute in Massachusetts in the 1950s.
This psychiatric center was primarily for children with psychological problems.
The Marselan Institute was the predecessor to St. Luke Institute. The Institute
evolved from a treatment center for children into a treatment center for priests
with behavioral problems. St. Luke Institute was also founded by a
priest/psychiatrist, Fr. Michael Peterson. 37. The Hartford Retreat (formerly
known as the Asylum) was opened in the 1822. This center is now known as the
Institute of Living. In 1954 Dr. Francis Braceland became medical director of
the Institute. Dr. Braceland was a devout Catholic and attended daily mass in
the Institute s inter—denominational chapel. Dr. Braceland was vitally
interested in the interface between religion and psychiatry and wrote a book on
religion and psychiatry in the 1950s. Braceland also consulted widely with
bishops and religious superiors about psychiatric problems in the priesthood and
encouraged referral of problem priests to the Institute. Dr. James Gill, a
Jesuit priest, was hired by Dr. Braceland. Dr. Gill was called in the case
involving Fr. Peebles in 1984. Fr. "B" from Dallas was subsequently
treated at the Institute of Living in 1994 after the Diocese received a
complaint regarding his activities with a minor girl in 1981.
38. The Servants of the Paraclete opened their
first spiritual retreat center in 1949 in Jemez Spring, New Mexico to care for
problematic priests. I recall the opening of the renewal center in Nevis,
Minnesota some time later. These were spiritual renewal centers founded on the
concept of a monastic type spiritual retreat and initially did not incorporate
psychiatric and psychological elements into their treatment programs. (In 1957
specialized treatment centers for priests with alcohol problems were set up as
"Guest House.")
39. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number
of Catholic treatment centers specifically for priests and religious opened, all
coinciding with a growing awareness among Catholic bishops and religious
superiors that sexual and moral/ spiritual problems had psychological
dimensions.
40. I was also aware of the opening of Southdown
in Toronto in 1966, and the House of Affirmation in the early 1970s. I was very
interested in these centers because of the incorporation of psychological and
psychiatric elements into their spiritual treatment programs .
41. I observed that as these facilities opened,
referrals of priests with sexual addictions increased. In my opinion, this
increase did not occur because sexual behaviors by priests were new problems or
because these facilities were opened for the express purpose of treating sexual
disorders; rather, the psychological treatment of problematic priests
highlighted the frequency of psychosexual disorders in the clergy. Cases of
recurrent, troublesome, and undeniable sexual abuse compelled Catholic bishops
and religious superiors to increase referrals to these new facilities.
42. Awareness of the dimensions of the problems
presented by sexual addictions expanded as psychology and psychiatry broke
through the barriers of secrecy as victims and perpetrators became willing to
talk more openly about their experiences.
43. I also followed with great interest as the
Servants of the Paraclete began to incorporate psychiatric awareness into their
treatment of priests. They were particularly attuned to problems of a sexual
nature. Awareness blossomed from a growing need to address a priest patient
population which presented with compulsive sexual disorders reflecting arrested
psychological development that could not be assisted by a spiritual retreat
alone. Priests of the Paraclete began training in psychology and sexuality in
San Francisco at the Institute for the Advanced Study of Sexuality in the early
1970s in order to prepare for the opening in 1976 of treatment programs to
address psychosexual disorders.
44. I kept abreast of the development of the
treatment programs called the Foundation House, Via Coeli, and Villa Martinez
which opened over time, starting in 1976.
45. I personally visited the Paraclete program in
1981, interviewed staff, and examined the treatment program. I have known Fr.
Michael Foley and Fr. Liam Hoare for some time and recently wrote a series of
reflections on celibacy for their national newsletter. I respect what I saw of
their work in 1981.
46. I want to re-emphasize that psychosexual
problems of priests were not a new phenomenon in the mid 1970s. But awareness of
psychiatric modes of addressing these problems was relatively new. The
establishment of treatment centers afforded bishops and religious superiors an
additional way to handle problems they had been dealing with all along within a
more exclusive and secret atmosphere.
47. The existence of Catholic treatment centers
and the types of treatment modalities available were widely known within the
Catholic community and were used by bishops and religious superiors to refer
priests for psychological treatment. These treatment centers included treatment
regimes for psychosexual disorders involving minors. Promotional literature
advertising these centers was sent out periodically to each bishop by many of
the centers. The Paraclete treatment programs were well advertised, known, and
respected.
48. In 1976 the Servants of the Paraclete opened
what was perhaps the first program in the world with a treatment regime designed
to treat psychosexual disorders including disorders involving the sexual abuse
of minors. The ability of the Catholic community to design and implement such a
program is both a reflection of the need for such a program and the degree of
knowledge of the scope of the problem of sexual misconduct with children by
Catholic priests and religious. The fact that preparations for the opening of
this program were years in the making demonstrates wide—spread knowledge of
existing sexual misconduct with minors by Catholic clergy by the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
49. It should be noted that the Paraclete program
treats only Catholic priests and religious on recommendation from their bishops
or religious superiors. The bishop or religious superior is responsible for all
treatment costs and is provided with periodic progress reports on the Catholic
priest or brother patient.
50. From all available sources, and my work and
research in the field, I have estimated that at least 1,300 priests and
religious have been treated for psychosexual disorders involving minors in the
past 25 years at a cost of over fifty million dollars
51. The Bishops Conference contributed money in
the 1970s to the Paracletes to support the development of their program. Since
the goals and purposes of the treatment program were well known within the
Catholic hierarchy, the goals and purposes would have been known to the Bishops
Conference as well. The Bishops Conference also issued directives regarding the
retention or destruction of the treatment reports provided to the Bishops-- and
the Paracletes and their staff followed these directives .
52. There is evidence that the Diocese of Dallas
was well aware of the resources available in the Catholic treatment center
network. They contacted Fr. James J. Gill, a Jesuit priest who is associated
with the Institute of Living, in 1984 in regard to Fr. Peebles. Fr. Gill, who is
a well-known Harvard—trained psychiatrist, has been giving workshops and
seminars all over the world on psychological issues affecting clergy since the
1960s. Also, in 1986 Fr. Peebles was evaluated at St. Luke, in 1992 Fr. Rudolph
Kos was a patient at the Paraclete Center in New Mexico, and Fr. "B"
was a patient at the Institute of Living in 1994.
53. I conclude that the bishops of the United
States, individually and collectively, were by the 1970s, well aware of certain
psychological problems of priests, including sexual involvement with minors, and
were also aware of alternative modes of addressing psychosexual problems other
than spiritual renewal and geographic transfers.
Back to Top of Report
FOURTH PHASE:
VICTIMS OF PRIEST SEXUAL ABUSE/THE BISHOPS' RESPONSE
54. In the late 1930s, psychiatric research and
writing began to acknowledge the harm of adult sexual activity with minors. This
fact is reflected in the growing body of psychiatric writing on this issue. The
advent of reporting laws in 1962 highlighted the growing awareness of the severe
harm that sexual abuse of children engendered in the child victim.
55. Prior to 1966, even the National Catholic
Welfare Conference (the organization that preceded the NCCB/USCC) had a Family
Life Bureau. The purpose of this Bureau was to study family life, which would
have included issues of premature adult-child sexual contact and the resulting
trauma to children.
56. As early as the 1960s, Catholic bishops and
religious superiors attempted to handle some of the more severe cases of sexual
misconduct through the use of psychiatry and psychology. This effort grew in
size, scope, and sophistication until by the late 1970s Catholic treatment
centers were on the cutting edge of psychiatry and psychology in the use of
sophisticated treatment techniques for the treatment of Catholic priests and
religious who had acted out sexually with minors. It is reasonable to ask: what
care was given to known child victims of priest sexual involvement? What steps
were taken to protect Catholic children and their families from the known risk
of future abuse?
57. In my practice I have treated victims of sexual misconduct by Catholic
priests and religious and reviewed multiple case histories. Some patients report
misconduct to Chancery Offices, bishops, and religious superiors. In response to
their complaints, victims consistently report that they were seen as traitors
and disloyal to their church. The victims felt that they were viewed as
seducers, seductresses, sinners, or, in some cases, opportunists, and treated
largely without sympathy.
58. As late as the early 1990s. an Archbishop
stated that priests who got involved with minors were the naive victims of
streetwise youngsters .
59. Although only a small percentage of parents
or victims of sexual abuse exposed themselves to bishops and religious
superiors, there were sufficient numbers who registered complaints so that the
bishops had sufficient data to be aware of the victims, their pain, and the harm
done to them. Complaints were discouraged because of the reception they
received. The Dallas cases demonstrate inappropriate responses to complaints.
Victims and their families were deceived, confused, ignored, not given credence,
or discouraged. These families were inhibited by false, incomplete, and
misleading information that would in effect serve the interest of the Church
rather than the best interest of the child victim. This pattern is quite
consistent in dioceses and archdioceses across the United States.
60. A victim is mistreated if, after he or she
registers a complaint or allegation of abuse, Church authorities refer them to
persons or agencies that will not deal with their complaints or problems
objectively, or fail respond in the victim s best interests. The referral to Dr.
McNamara in the Hughes case is one such example. Victims are mistreated if
Church authorities enter into lengthy negotiations which go nowhere and often
result in the victims and their families becoming discouraged; or if Church
officials fail to act in a timely fashion to promote victims welfare. Victims
and their families are mistreated if Church officials make false promises,
impart false or incomplete information, or hold false hope of reconciliation or
appropriate action. Examples of these patterns and practices are evident in each
of the Dallas cases. Such mistreatment is consistent with my observation of the
pattern in dioceses and religious houses across the United States.
Back to Top of Report
FIFTH PHASE: THE
SECRET SYSTEM IS BREACHED
61. The Louisiana cases came to public attention
in 1985. These cases were unique because, for the first time, evidence of prior
knowledge, in this case on the part of the Bishop of the Diocese of Lafayette,
escaped the secret system and entered the public domain. Prior to 1985, there
had been criminal prosecutions and lawsuits alleging sexual misconduct with
minors by priests and religious, but evidence of prior knowledge did not leave
the secret system. The Lafayette case was the first time the established
practice for handling these cases by the Church became public. It is clear to me
that the Catholic hierarchy in the United States, represented by the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops, acutely appreciated the significance of this
type of public knowledge because the hierarchy (at the highest levels) became
involved, including the General Counsel and Secretary General of the Bishops
Conference and the Canonist from the Apostolic Delegate s Office. This
involvement implies that the Catholic hierarchy was aware of the threat
presented to the secret system by wide-spread public knowledge of the manner in
which abuse cases had previously been handled. The media had been very reluctant
to defy the hierarchy of the Catholic Church with any public exposure of
malfeasance. This reluctance, to some degree, extended to religion in general.
Ordinarily, Catholic bishops in their various countries had been able to control
the media and even the civil courts. In the Lafayette case, such control was
partially lost. Still, even in Lafayette, Louisiana, only a small part of the
total clergy misconduct was ever made public; detailed knowledge by the public
of the scope of the actual abuse was not wide—spread.
62. An independent Catholic media reported some
details of the events in Lafayette. Exposure in this arena exerted more pressure
on the secret system which had previously concealed priest sex abuse of
children.
63. In 1992 a particularly egregious case of
priestly sexual misconduct involving children was widely reported in both the
print and visual media. A Catholic priest, James Porter, abused nearly 200
victims. This case also involved credible evidence of knowledge on the part of
numerous bishops and other Church superiors: transfers to avoid scandal, lack of
supervision, and active concealment of Fr. Porter s crimes. For the first time,
some victims of abuse by other priests who became aware of the news coverage
realized that they were not alone——their own experiences were similar to the
publicly discussed events of the Porter case. This knowledge empowered some of
these victims to come forward and discuss publicly their own experiences of
abuse by priests.
64. In the period from 1985 to 1992, there was a
growing sensitivity to the realization that Catholic bishops and religious
superiors could be involved in concealing knowledge of criminal activities by
Catholic priests and religious. A growing mass of people who had been violated
began to share some of their experiences with psychologists, psychiatrists,
spouses, parents, friends, and attorneys. Sharing created a body of hundreds of
thousands of people who knew a reality that hitherto had not been publicly
discussed. National exposure of evidence of on—going concealment of Porter s
activities by numerous Catholic bishops led to the realization on the part of
some victims and their families that they had perhaps been deceived by religious
authorities in their dioceses as well. There is evidence of this dynamic and of
such concealment on the part of the Dallas Diocese and NCCB/USCC in each of the
Dallas cases and the Military Vicariate in two of the cases involving Fr.
Peebles.
Back to Top of Report
THE HARM TO
VICTIMS OF PRIEST/RELIGIOUS SEXUAL ABUSE
65. It is well documented that the sexual abuse
of a child is harmful to that child and distorts the child s normal
psychological development. My work with abuse victims and review of the
literature provides concrete support for this statement .
66. The sexual abuse of a child by a priest
frequently develops gradually and presents several complicated features: 1) the
sexual contact arises from a relationship involving immense trust on the part of
the minor; 2) the child is extraordinarily vulnerable in that the priest is seen
as an agent of God; 3) an affectionate relationship often precedes the sexual
contact so that the child feels that he (usually) or she has a very special
relationship to the priest; 4) there is an incredible helplessness on the part
of the abused child — most abused minors either feel responsible for the abuse
occurring, or so powerless that they feel they cannot disclose the abuse to
their parents, and often, to anyone else; 5) such secrecy surrounds the abuse
that disclosure is inhibited — sometimes reinforced by threats — which
allows the abuse to continue; and 6) if the abuse is revealed, the child victim
is rarely handled in a responsible, pastoral manner by bishops. Moreover, the
parents trust in their bishop permits manipulation, intimidation, and, in some
cases, active deceit, with negative consequences to the welfare of the child.
67. Effects of abuse can sometime be seen
immediately by trained professionals in the form of depression, moodiness,
withdrawal, or acting out, but the origins of distress are very difficult to
distinguish without competent professional assistance. Many times, the effects
are quite subtle and become clarified only in retrospect.
68. The long-term effect of sexual abuse on
children can be pervasive and debilitating when certain conditions are present
in the abuse dynamic. These pervasive and debilitating effects have been
discussed in case histories and studies presented in psychiatric and
psychological literature for many years prior to the events giving rise to the
Dallas litigation. Bishops and religious superiors and their advisors in the
field of psychology and psychiatry knew and could appreciate, by the 1970s in my
opinion, the harm resulting to a child victims of abuse by a trusted priest or
religious .
69. By 1982, individuals possessing child
pornography were designated more serious offenders and distinguished from others
possessing pornography involving adults. Recently, three Catholic priests were
among a group of 45 men arrested in a (1995/96) FBI sting for receiving child
pornography. One was sentenced to ten years in prison. Another anticipates a 12
to 18 month sentence. The third case is pending. The case of New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982) also reviewed the literature in the area of child sex abuse
and acknowledges the longstanding awareness in professional and legal circles of
the harm to children from such abuse.
70. In 1984 and 1985 Fr. Michael Peterson of St.
Luke Institute, Fr. Thomas Doyle, a Canonist at the Papal Nunciature, and Mr.
Ray Mouton, a civil attorney representing Fr. Gilbert Gauthe, prepared an
extensive report on the civil, canonical, and psychological aspects of priest
sexual involvement with children. This report included well-documented
statements regarding the long-term harmful effects to a child victim of sexual
abuse. In September, 1993 the Ad Hoc Committee on Sexual Abuse of the NCCB
admitted that this report identified virtually the same issues that had
previously been analyzed for the bishops.
71. In 1985 David Finkelhor, Ph.D., and Angela
Brown, Ph.D., digested what was known from the previous research into a powerful
model that left no doubt about the potential for long-term harm to child sex
abuse victims. The interplay of four dynamics are known to be active ingredients
in the sexual abuse of children by priests and religious. The atmosphere of
secrecy surrounding the response of bishops/superiors/vicars/ priests to the
notice of abuse accentuated the dynamic of victimization. These dynamics
include: traumatic sexualization, stigmatization, betrayal, and powerlessness.
Each of these dynamics are evident in the Dallas cases and are causally related
to the extensive harm documented in the Plaintiffs' psychological profiles. See
Table 1 (attached), Traumagenic Dynamics in the Impact of Child Sexual Abuse,
from the Finkelhor/Brown article.
72. It is mystifying that the Diocese of Dallas
continued to refer abuse victims and perpetrators to professionals who either
had conflicting alliances with the Dallas Diocese (Dr. McNamara) or who were
denied the information necessary to render an adequate and objective diagnosis
(Dr. Jaeckle and St. Luke Institute).
Back to Top of Report
COMPONENTS OF THE
SECRET SYSTEM - SEXUAL ACTIVITY BY PUBLICLY CELIBATE PRIESTS AND RELIGIOUS
73. Celibacy, the state of non-marriage and the
practice of perfect chastity, is a requirement for ordination to the Catholic
priesthood in the Latin Rite. (Canon 277) . The Catholic bishop is mandated to
supervise and assure compliance with this requirement. Celibacy is an on-going
requirement for the active priesthood. This amounts to a certification that any
active Catholic priest is sexually safe. The bishops, religious superiors, and
their media operations in the United States have assiduously fostered this image
and assumption .
74. Indeed, what an unassailably noble ideal
celibacy is: characterized by complete devotion to God, free from all
ambivalence, a living symbol of the universality and meaning of divine love and
complete availability and devotion to the service of humanity. I have no quarrel
with the concept and pursuit of the celibate ideal.
75. Certainly, the vast majority of Catholic
priests do not sexually abuse minors. But, because the consequences of the abuse
of a child by a person holding spiritual power is so dire and long—lasting,
even a small proportion of perpetrators within ministry is a matter of extreme
public interest and urgency. Moreover, the fact that such abuse occurs in other
parts of society does not lessen the need for responsible action by Catholic
bishops in the United States in regard to their own priests, bishops, and lay
members of their church.
76. As I stated above, by 1976 Dr. Bartemeier and
I were able to estimate that 6% of all Catholic priests and religious involved
themselves with minors. If we could know, I believe the bishops knew as well.
77. Fr. Andrew Greeley, a priest sociologist from
the Archdiocese of Chicago, has estimated that between 5-7% of Catholic priests
involve themselves sexually with minors.
78. Various other sources estimate the percentage
of all Catholic priests who involve themselves sexually with minors from 2% to
10% . There is some confusion as to whether these figures refer only to
pedophiles (sexual involvement with pre—pubescent children), ephebophiles
(sexual involvement with adolescents), or to both. I estimate that 2% of all
Catholic priests are pedophiles and that an additional 4% involve themselves
with adolescents (ephebophiles).
79. When individual Catholic institutions or
dioceses are considered, the proportion of those alleged or indicted for the
sexual abuse of minors frequently runs higher than my estimates. For example,
several Catholic dioceses in the United States reveal that over 10% of active
priests have been sexually involved with minors.
80. An extensive study of a California minor
seminary (student ages 13-17) was conducted in 1993 by an independent review
board consisting of religious and lay professionals in the field of social work
and psychology, law and medicine. This study showed that 25% of the religious
faculty (Franciscan Friars) had inappropriate sexual contact with minor students
over a twenty-three (23) year period.
81. A similar pattern of misconduct was
documented in a Midwestern minor seminary (student ages 13—17) between the
years 1968-1986 when fourteen (14) victims complained about sexual abuse by six
priest faculty members. Additional complaints were registered against three
priest members of the faculty between 1972 and 1992. My study suggests that only
a small proportion of abusing priests or religious within any given community or
area ever come to public notice, even when efforts at discovery and disclosure
are maintained. The secret system surrounding priests and bishops is very
protective and well established.
82. My studies reveal that sexual abuse within
seminaries by priest faculty is significant because 10% of clergy report having
been sexually abused during their course of study for ordination .
83. Sexual abuse is not a problem unique to the
Catholic priesthood in the United States. In Canada, the Catholic Archbishop of
Newfoundland established an independent commission to study the long—term
sexual abuse of minors in one of its institutions. The Newfoundland study
revealed that 13 of 107 priests were involved in sexual activities with minors.
An additional 23 religious brothers and employees of the church were also
implicated. The published report, which was completed in 1990, was the
springboard for reforms initiated by the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops
and implemented in dioceses across Canada.
84. A 1991 study of a random sample of Catholic
clergy in South Africa revealed that approximately 45% of priests reported being
sexually active with an unspecified partner within the previous two years. This
study was conducted by a Catholic priest, Victor Kotze.
85. A 1995 study of priests in Spain alleges that
7% of all priests have committed grave sexual offenses against minors. The same
study reports that of a sample of 354 priests who were sexually active, 26%
acted out sexually with minors. Overall, the author claims that 60% of all
Catholic priests in Spain are sexually active.
86. In 1996 the Irish Conference of Catholic
Bishops, in a written statement, pledged full cooperation with police and civil
authorities to bring known perpetrators in the Catholic priesthood in Ireland to
justice. The Irish Conference also apologized to the lay Catholic community for
its long—standing failure to respond to notices of the abuse of children by
Catholic priests in Ireland.
87. The Australian Conference of Catholic Bishops
in May 1996, acknowledged similar problems with Catholic clergy in Australia and
issued a policy statement concerning cooperation with an investigation announced
by a Royal Commission. Notice was read in each parish in Australia.
88. As I have explained in other sections of this
report, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in the United States, as
exemplified by the bishops, archbishops, cardinals and other members of the
Bishops Conference of the United States, has known of this problem for some
time. As I have explained, I estimate that 2% of all Catholic priests are
sexually involved with prepubescent children (pedophiles) and 4% of Catholic
priests are sexually involved with adolescents (ephebophiles) . Well established
studies show that the average pedophiles has 250 or more victims over his
lifetime. We do not have the same studies available for ephebophiles. Fr. Andrew
Greeley estimates that there are between 100,000—150,000 victims of sex abuse
by Catholic priests and religious in the United States. In my work, I have never
attempted to make an estimate of victims.
89. The evidence of the widespread sexual abuse
of minors by Catholic clergy in the United States is only one indication of the
lack of celibate practice among Catholic clergy. Four times as many Catholic
priests and religious are involved with women than are involved with children,
and nearly three times as many are involved with adult men.
90. A separate problem within the Catholic
priesthood is the issue of homosexuality, particularly in light of the Church s
condemnation of homosexual practice. Knowledgeable observers, including
authorities within the Church, estimate that 40-50% of all Catholic priests have
a homosexual orientation and that a majority of these are sexually active. From
my studies, I estimate that only 30% of Catholic priests have a homosexual
orientation and that only half of these are sexually active. See Lothstein, 34
Catholic Law Rev. 89 (1994) .
91. As of 1980, there had been no published
studies regarding the sexual behavior of Catholic priests serving in public
ministry. In 1980, a dissertation study of homosexual priests was conducted by a
Catholic priest at the Institute for Advanced Study of Human Sexuality. The
final sample involved 50 gay Catholic priests from across the United States
ranging age from 27 to 58 years. Of the sample, only two of the 50 priests, or
4%, were currently abstaining from sex. The number of previous same-sex partners
for the sample population revealed an average of 227 same—sex partners per
survey participant, ranging from 11 participants who reported 500 or more
partners to 9 who reported no more than 10. A total of 49, or 98% of the survey
sample stated they intended to continue in a gay lifestyle in the future. In
addition, 88% stated that, in spite of their sexual activity, they would again
take a vow of celibacy.
92. The widespread lack of celibate practice is
relevant to the central issue of the sexual abuse of minors by Catholic clergy
because a community that publicly proclaims the sexual safety of its members at
the same time that it tolerates sexual activity restricts the ability of
bishops, vicars, pastors and priests to properly supervise, discipline, and
explore the criminal activities of priests who abuse children. Exposure of one
part of the system——abusive priests——threatens to expose a whole system
that supports a lack of celibate conformity within the priesthood.
93. The large number of sexually active
homosexual priests further complicates the issue because of the potential for
public controversy and disapproval of this behavior, particularly in view of the
Church s own disparagement of homosexual orientation as an "inherently
disordered condition."
94. The question of homosexuality is sometimes
confused with the issue of sexual abuse of minors because of the
disproportionate number of male minors who are victims of priest sexual abuse.
Some clinicians report that 90% of priests' sexual victims are male. I have
found that priest victimize boys at least twice as often as girls. Whatever the
ratio, it is clear that priest molest minor boys proportionately more frequently
than abusers in the general population. See Lothstein, 34 Cath. Law Rev. 89
(1994) .
95. It is my opinion that the need to maintain
secrecy, to control public knowledge of the sexual abuse of minors by Catholic
clerics, to avoid prosecution for such crimes, and to protect the reputation and
finances of the Catholic Church has led to what the Dallas plaintiffs term
"a conspiracy" of the bishops and religious superiors to conceal these
crimes against minors Through this "conspiracy", bishops strove to
avoid decisive and responsible action because of fear of scandal, and in spite
of the known risk of harm to the welfare of the Catholic minors who were at
risk. Secrecy in the face of knowledge of the risk of harm to children is not
only reprehensible, it is potentially illegal.
Back to Top of Report
DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE NEGLIGENCE OF VARIOUS
DEFENDANTS
96. I am conversant with the role and
responsibility of the Bishops Conference (Defendants NCCB/USCC) with regard to
priestly training and formation as a result of having taught in several major
Catholic seminaries since 1967. The Bishops' Conference has been very active in
establishing binding guidelines for seminary training, in the certification and
evaluation of seminary faculty and students, and in establishing standards to be
met by seminary students and faculty. The Bishops Conference was also active in
commissioning studies on priestly formation and training.
97. I am also conversant with the role of the
Bishops Conference in establishing, coordinating and executing national policy
on behalf of the Catholic church on issues impacting Catholic life in the United
States. In this regard, the Bishops Conference is the Catholic entity which
coordinates and directs research efforts on issues of interest to Catholic life
in the United States.
98. I am also well aware of the media operations
of the Bishops Conference including Catholic News Service, the largest Catholic
news agency in the world, their publication, Origins, and the numerous pastoral
plans, pastoral letters, and other statements expressing the policy of the
Catholic Bishops of the United States which the Bishops Conference issues and
which speak directly to the lay Catholic community throughout our nation.
99. In my opinion, the NCCB/USCC was responsible
for and negligent in the following respects:
-
failing to acknowledge and warn the Catholic
public of the danger to minors arising from the known propensity of some
Catholic priests and religious to act out sexually with children.
-
promulgating national standards for priestly
training and formation that did not adequately address the need to identify
seminarians who——because of their own psychosexual immaturity--were at risk
for non-celibate behavior and so were not suitable for a public ministry
involving minors.
-
failing to establish and implement a national
policy involving an informed, supervisory laity; prominent is the absence of any
plan to prevent sexual activity with minors by Catholic priests and religious.
100. I am also conversant with the role of
individual Catholic bishops in the United States. Each Catholic bishop is
responsible for the safety and welfare of the lay Catholic community within his
diocese. The diocesan bishop has the authority to control and direct all
Catholic activities within his diocese, including the ordination, assignment,
supervision and discipline of all Catholic priests and religious within his
diocese and his power to excommunicate those within his jurisdiction who do not
conform.
101.
In my opinion the Bishop of
Dallas, and his delegates, were negligent in the following respects:
-
the failure to investigate numerous reports,
complaints, rumors, red flags, and other clear indications of a substantial risk
to children from sexual misconduct with minors on the part of Fathers Peebles,
Kos, Hughes, and other priests.
-
the repeated assignment of Catholic priests to
positions involving access to Catholic children when such clerics were
unsuitable for such assignment without proper supervision or warnings to
Catholic parents and children.
-
the repeated failure to properly supervise the
activities of Fathers Peebles, Hughes, and Kos despite clear notice that the
activities of these clerics presented a substantial risk of harm from
inappropriate, immature, or even illegal sexual misconduct with minors.
-
the failure to implement proper warnings and
instructions to Catholic parents and their children despite the known risk of
sexual misconduct with minors on the part of priests of the Dallas Diocese.
102. The Military Vicariate/Archdiocese for
Military Services is a diocese, like the Dallas Diocese, and is headed by a
bishop who has the authority to endorse Catholic priests and religious as
suitable candidates for military service. This endorsement to the Department of
Defense warrants that the priest candidate is morally, spiritually,
intellectually and emotionally qualified to represent the Catholic faith and to
serve as an officer in the United States military.
103.
In my opinion the Military Vicariate was
negligent in the following respects:
-
in failing to conduct an adequate
investigation of Fr. Robert Peebles qualifications to serve as a reserve officer
in the United States Army in 1981.
-
in failing to conduct an adequate
investigation of Fr. Robert Peebles qualifications to serve as an active duty
officer in the United States Army in 1982.
-
in endorsing Fr. Robert R. Peebles, Jr. in
1981 as qualified to represent the Catholic faith as a reserve military officer
when he was a sex offender and abused alcohol at the time of the endorsement.
-
in endorsing Fr. Robert R. Peebles, Jr. in 1982 as qualified to represent the
Catholic faith as an active duty military officer when he was a sex offender and
abused alcohol at the time of the endorsement.
-
in failing to conduct an investigation
following the incident at the Galilee Retreat House in June, 1982 when Fr.
Robert R. Peebles, Jr. appeared with an underage boy who shared sleeping
quarters with Fr. Peebles at a time when Fr. Peebles was under the supervision
and direction of bishops and agents of the Military Vicariate.
-
in failing to advise the United States Army in
1981 that the endorsement of suitability for active service issued in January,
1981 was fraudulent because Fr. Peebles was a sex offender and alcohol abuser
unsuited to wear the uniform of an officer of the United States army.
-
in failing to advise the United States Army in
June of 1982 that the endorsement of suitability for active service issued in
February, 1982 was fraudulent because Fr. Peebles was a sex offender and alcohol
abuser unsuited to wear the uniform of an officer of the United States army.
104. It is my opinion that the cases involving
Fathers Peebles, Hughes, and Kos fit a nationwide pattern that I have observed
over the last 35 years. This pattern involves knowledge of ongoing sexual
misconduct by Catholic priests and religious and cooperation among bishops to
keep such misconduct from becoming public knowledge. Such a pattern is found in
all dioceses and religious orders in the United States and perhaps in many
countries in the world. The cases involving Fathers Peebles, Kos, and Hughes
also fit the pattern I have observed in terms of the method of operation of the
priest, the knowledge of the diocese, the diocese s response, and (in the
Peebles cases) the cooperation among bishops in the assignment of the offending
cleric and in the bishop s response to evidence of sexual misconduct with minors
on the part of the offending cleric. I do not believe that it is accidental that
these cases are handled in the same way in dioceses and religious orders
throughout the United States. The following are uniform practices: failing to
investigate indications of any sexual misconduct, even with children; failing to
properly supervise the cleric in his assignment; failing to ensure that the
cleric is prosecuted for misconduct with children. Once an incident occurs
energy and policies at the highest levels of Church authority have been directed
to damage control, avoidance of scandal at all costs, and efforts to placate and
manipulate victims and families. The latter often involves intimidation,
misleading information, and even fraudulent means, if necessary. Policy also
involves maintaining the priest in a new assignment without proper supervision
and without informing the congregation where the abusive behavior usually
continues.
105. This common pattern is strong evidence of an
agreement on how to handle these cases and a plan to achieve the desired result,
i.e. the avoidance of public knowledge and accountability for illegal sexual
misconduct by Catholic priests and religious with minors. Another publicity
tactic is to minimize priest/Church involvement when abuse becomes public. For
instance, Church representatives claim that priest molest less than other
groups. Other public relations ploys to avoid accountability involve
manipulation and intimidation of the media, claiming "Church bashing,"
"priest bashing," or "Catholic bashing" at any revelation of
priestly malfeasance, trying to discredit those reporting the malfeasance. It is
my opinion that the conspiracy alleged by the plaintiffs does in fact exist and
preceded the events in Dallas. This conspiracy is not only negligent but
reprehensible, and may involve some criminal behavior as well.
106. Of particular significance to the Dallas
litigation is the fact that each and every plaintiff in these cases were either
known or knowable to the Dallas Diocese, and, where John Doe I and IV (Peebles)
are concerned, to the Military Vicariate. The bishops and their psychiatric and
psychological advisors knew or should have known that these victims required
assistance in order to mitigate the harmful effects of sexual abuse by a trusted
spiritual advisor. The Dallas Diocese and the Military Vicariate did nothing to
assist the claimants in these cases, and instead took actions which increased
the harm to the victims. It is my opinion as a psychotherapist that the harm to
these victims continued through the years and was increased and made chronic by
the actions of these defendants.
Back to Top of Report
DIOCESE OF DALLAS
107. In the Dallas Diocese there is a
well-established pattern of knowledge and damage control by keeping violations
secret, even though the diocese is aware of the misconduct. This pattern
includes:
-
knowledge of sexual misconduct by Fr.
"E" in 1966 by the Vicar General which did not result in investigation
or supervision with the result that Fr. "E" went on to abuse
additional minors.
-
reports of unspecified misconduct on the part
Fr. "A" in 1967.
-
notice of homosexual misconduct with boys on
the part of Rudy Kos prior to his admission to the seminary in 1976.
-
knowledge of Fr. Robert Peebles violations by
at least 1980 with numerous subsequent notices of violation to the Dallas
Diocese and the Military Vicariate (John Doe IV brought to retreat house in
1982, rape of boy in 1984, re—offense in 1986).
-
knowledge of Fr. "B's" activities
with a minor girl in Irving, perhaps as early as 1981.
-
a consistent pattern of pedophilic behavior on
the part of Fr. Rudolph Kos throughout his ministry from 1981 through 1992.
-
reports of possible sexual misconduct with
minors on the part of Fr. "C" and Fr. "D" in the mid to late
1980s.
-
covering up the diocese s prior knowledge of
Fr. "B s" misconduct in Irving in 1981 by advising this claimant in
June of 1993 that no one in the Dallas Diocese had any inkling of this behavior
when it was known by the Bishop, Vicar General, Business Manager, Superintendent
of Schools, and at least two pastors and a school principal prior to June of
1993 according to deposition testimony by the Superintendent of Schools.
Back to Top of Report
MILITARY
VICARIATE
108. A similar pattern is evident in the behavior
of the Military Vicariate in that I have been shown evidence of a consistent
pattern of endorsing Catholic priests and religious as suitable to serve the
Catholic faith in the military who had a prior history of sexual misconduct with
children. I am also aware of a pattern of allowing the Catholic chaplains to
resign their commissions rather than face Court Martial. This pattern existed
prior to the Peebles case.
Back to Top of Report
RAY K.
MCNAMARA, PH.D.
109. In my opinion Dr. McNamara assisted the
diocese in the cover—up regarding the victims of both Hughes and Peebles in
that Dr. McNamara had a dual relationship with the Dallas Diocese at the time of
his advice to and treatment of John Doe I in the Peebles case and Jane Doe I in
the Hughes case. Because of this dual relationship, Dr. McNamara should not have
advised or treated either plaintiff. In reviewing Dr. McNamara s deposition and
treatment records, I see no evidence that he appropriately diagnosed and treated
these individuals. Finally, Dr. McNamara s admission that he destroyed original
treatment records which are important to this case in August, 1993 was in my
opinion done to conceal material information and furthered the
"conspiracy" concerning the concealment of the crimes against children
on the part of Fathers Peebles, Kos, Hughes, and numerous other priests of the
Dallas Diocese, some of whom had been treated by Dr. McNamara. Some of my
further observations and opinions are as follows:
-
As to the Hughes victim, Dr. McNamara
perpetuated the cover-up by failing to serve her interest vs. that of the Dallas
Diocese.
-
Dr. McNamara was co-opted into the system of
avoiding scandal. He did this by failing to foster the victim s freedom of
choice. Knowing about the abuse from the parental interviews, there is no
evidence he dealt with it with his patient. By doing this, he fell within the
secret system of avoidance and perpetuated the victimization and the cover up.
Is his avoidance conditioned by his allegiance to the Diocese? Does his
involvement constitute a conflict of interest? A collusive dual relationship
proscribed by therapist/ patient ethical practice? I believe it does based on
the 1981 APA Standards.
-
As to the Peebles victim (Doe I--Peebles),
there seems to be a pattern of conflict when it comes to priests of the Diocese.
For instance, McNamara treated the family of a victim, the victim and the
perpetrator without disclosing this conflict. He also was treating other priests
of the Diocese, receiving referrals from the Diocese, and consulting with the
Tribunal, including Fr. Fellhauer (the Bishop s agent in the Peebles matter),
again without disclosing this conflict.
-
Dr. McNamara, regarding Doe I, again failed to
discuss the nature and extent of the sexual abuse of the victim and there is
little evidence that he adequately assessed the victim s needs and best
interests. At the same time, he was receiving counseling referrals from the
diocese and being financially subsidized by the Diocese. He should not have
become involved in this case.
-
The record demonstrates that Dr. McNamara made
the judgment that John Doe I (Peebles) not be permitted to testify against
Robert Peebles. The record also reflects that parents adopted that judgment,
assuming that it was from an unbiased third party when in fact Dr. McNamara had
a long-standing relationship with the Diocese that was not disclosed and a dual
relationship and conflict of interest in this matter.
-
Dr. McNamara also failed to take the victim s
needs into account and take direct measures to make sure the victim received
needed therapeutic support despite the fact that he continued to treat the
victim s family until 1987.
-
The parents allege that Dr. McNamara counseled
the family not to keep pressuring John Doe I (Peebles) to discuss the
molestation; if true, such advice effectively fosters secrecy to the detriment
of the victim.
-
It appears that Dr. McNamara s advice was
followed in that the molestation was kept secret, even within the family, and
not discussed in any depth until December of 1992. What was Dr. McNamara's role
in this?) This pattern of events reflects the attempt of the system to co-opt agencies, including mental heath agencies and legal agencies, into the secret
system and for the avoidance of scandal. This pattern is consistent with the
nationwide pattern I have observed. These efforts fail when the victim is
empowered and the facts can no longer be contained within the secret system.
Psychotherapy should empower victims to speak up, even in the media and in the
Courts, when appropriate. In my opinion, Dr. McNamara made repeated attempts to
silence victims and conceal wrongdoing——contrary to the best interests of
his patients——in the service of the secret system.
-
There is no evidence that Dr. McNamara ever
reported Fr. Peebles or Fr. Hughes to the proper authorities although he was a
mandatory reporter.
Back to Top of Report
OBSERVATIONS
REGARDING THE CASE OF FR. WILLIAM HUGHES
110. Hughes is an example of arrested adolescent
development where the natural attraction of a 26 year old man is to a 12—13
year old girl because this is his age emotionally. Why was this not
discovered/monitored nor support provided by Religious system?
-
Before Abuse is Discovered:
-
Father of girl becomes suspicious when he
observes daughter rubbing Hughes back (before sexual conduct starts) . This was
discounted by Mother and ultimately by Father because Hughes was a priest and
"priests are celibate." There are other warning signs also. (Proper
warning from Diocese and NCCB would have prevented abuse.)
-
No registration at parish of Hughes' pattern
of behavior although girl is calling all the time; she is seen with priest and
priest spends all his time with family and girl. Hughes behavior was obviously
observed by the pastor. Fr. Clayton commented to Fr. Kos about Hughes practice
of being at St. Luke s School when school let out. This coincided with his
activities concerning Jane Doe I. It should be noted that there is also possible
evidence of similar behavior on the part of Fr. "E". (denial/lack of
supervision). No investigation is conducted.
-
Typical seduction pattern by priest involves
winning the trust of the family.
-
CLUE: Jane Doe s brothers observe the
relationship between the priest and Jane Doe——"he s not here to see us,
he s here to see Jane Doe." This is another indication that a proper
warning would have prevented the abuse. But such a warning is incompatible with
the image of the priesthood that the Church wants to project .
-
Systemic failure to study problem and to
prevent sexual misconduct——and provide the tools for proper supervision and
to give lay people the tools to protect themselves; priests presented as
completely safe. Emphasis was on preventing scandal and covering
up misconduct in order to preserve image. This amounts to a deception.
-
Also before abuse: the Church system that
fosters denial and refuses to acknowledge sexual reality and impropriety,
including sexual conduct with children, deprives a Pastor of the tools and
support to process information, even if he recognizes what is occurring
(denial/lack of warning)
-
While abuse is occurring:
-
Hughes misses 6:00 mass a number of times
because he and Jane Doe oversleep in his room (denial/lack of supervision)
-
Hughes spends inordinate amount of time with
one family and one girl; no registration by parish. Housekeeper finds nude
photo. Denial/lack of supervision. No investigation is conducted.
-
After the abuse is discovered and unavoidably
exposed, what occurs:
-
The family is drawn the secret system; they
call Fr. Cloherty, asking "Who do we see if we think a priest is in love
with a little girl?" He responds "come see me." A meeting is held
at the Chancery office (becomes a secret place) . According to the testimony of
the parents they arrive with two shopping bags of love letters.
-
Priest advises parents to keep it quiet (this
is disputed fact but the testimony of the parents fits the national pattern) .
-
Priest disposed of the evidence (this is
disputed fact but the testimony of the parents fits the national pattern).
-
Church refers parents to Dr. McNamara with
whom the Church had an ongoing relationship.
-
Parents placed great trust in Diocese
officials.
-
Church deflects family attention from the
issue of the sexual abuse of child and instead focuses on preventing scandal for
the good of the church.
-
Parental consultation with the highest
officials in the Diocese, i.e. Vicar General and Bishop, is met with resistance
and denial amounting to a cover up. (Vicar General says "prove it.").
No investigation is conducted.
-
The systematic promotion of some priest
violators insures secrecy within system. Hughes, a known child abuser, is
appointed to the priest personnel board in 1989.
-
Fr. Hughes is never prosecuted.
Back to Top of Report
OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE CASE OF FR.
ROBERT R. PEEBLES, JR.
111.
Prior knowledge:
-
Peebles demonstrated serious characterological
problems in the seminary by the dichotomy between his intelligence and
performance and his erratic academic record. Faculty reported poor interpersonal
relationships, especially with people his own age.
-
Peebles revealed a concern over poor impulse
control when he was in the seminary. (Problems with chronic masturbation)
-
Problems evidenced from seminary with
interpersonal relationships .
-
There is a record of negative recommendations
before ordination, including a statement by one pastor who had a "spooky
feeling". No investigation is conducted.
-
Peebles manifested a classic Borderline
Personality Disorder - which was not properly diagnosed or treated until
after multiple incidents of abuse
112.
Knowledge after Ordination:
-
A parent has suspicions of inappropriateness
that he conveyed to Fr. Scott while Peebles was assigned to St. John s in Ennis.
Fr. Scott advises Vicar General of rumors of sexual misconduct with boys during
camp-out (time frame unclear but probably by 1980). The son had in fact been
abused but no investigation conducted and boy never identified or assisted.
-
Fr. Peebles method of seduction consistently
involves alcohol for both himself and for minor boys, along with tobacco. He
traps boys into secrecy to cover up "their" behavior from their
parents.
-
Peebles is caught abusing a boy at St. Mark s
and "agrees to counseling to avoid prosecution." Peebles at St. Mark s
from 1979-1981. Told military investigator he was caught in 1981 at All Saints.
No investigation is conducted .
-
In 1981, Peebles is struggling and is involved
sexually with adolescents. Vicar General "notices he is depressed" and
recommends counseling, recognizing Peebles distress. Permission is given to
enter Military Reserves. No investigation is conducted.
-
In 1981, Diocese inexplicably and
unjustifiably appoints Peebles as Director of Scouting.
-
Peebles appointment as Director of Scouting
conforms to a pattern of systemic cover-up. The public image fostered is that he
can't be a child abuser because we would never appointed him as Diocesan
Director of Scouting .
-
Bishop has conversation with Dr. McCandlish in
1981 (who is treating Peebles) about the subject of whether a child abuser would
repeat behavior.
-
Peebles advised McCandlish in 1981 of
inclination to abuse boys. What was done? Was a report made to authorities?
-
In 1981 when Peebles is endorsed as
spiritually, morally, intellectually qualified to be an officer in U.S. military
reserves and Catholic Chaplain, there is evidence that this endorsement is
fraudulent in that he is abusing children and alcohol.
-
Military Chaplaincy offers a great latitude of
life style operation; greater than diocese.
-
In January, 1982, Peebles advises a Retreat
Director of fact he is out of control and abusing boys. "Don't worry about
harming boys, boys will bounce back". No investigation is conducted.
-
February 1982, permission is given for Peebles
to enter active military. This endorsement is also fraudulent.
-
At Chaplain
training retreat under control and supervision of Military Vicariate in
May-June, 1982, Peebles presents himself in the company of a young boy with whom
he billets under the open observation of Catholic military Vicariate officials.
Subsequent failure to investigate is negligent.
-
Although there was notice of Peebles behavior,
undeniable evidence of sexual acting out is presented when abused boy confronts
military police in March of 1984 and Peebles confesses. Now the diocese (and
Vicariate) are forced to do something because of heightened threat of scandal.
-
Peebles is sent for psychiatric help and
diagnosed as borderline personality disorder; the 1984 incident Peebles reports
as isolated. A real effort at help or damage control and containment of scandal?
Indicated by the manner in which the boy and parents were handled by the Diocese
of Dallas and the Catholic chaplain (Fr. Ortiz)?
-
Several Catholic systems cooperated to avoid
scandal. Chaplain Michael Ortiz was given statements from the boy and Peebles
and responsibility to contact boy s parents and coordinate his return to Dallas.
Parents were not notified and boy remained alone and unaided in a Catholic
parish house for 1 1/2 days while Peebles prepared his request to resign from
military as part of the maneuver to avoid court martial. Even after confessing
to military authorities that he abused John Doe I, Peebles is observed saying
Mass by the military investigator, John Greeley.
-
The maneuvers to avoid criminal prosecution
required Military Vicariate (Chaplain Ortiz), Fr. Fellhauer (Dallas Diocese) and
Dr. Ray McNamara to divert the efforts of the family and the victim in favor of
the perpetrator to avoid scandal and protect the church. This is a typical
pattern.
-
The force of these maneuvers were so well
coordinated and "practiced" that they could subvert and bypass
superior military authority consisting of a Major General in charge of a major
command and all U.S. Ground Forces Worldwide who was determined to court martial
this admitted rapist. This demonstrates the facility, power and operation of the
secret system as it interlocks between a particular diocese (the Dallas
Diocese), the Military Ordinariate, and a co-opted mental health provider, Dr.
McNamara. Dr. McNamara "evaluates the victim" and convinces parents
not to allow victim to testify.
-
Peebles is reassigned to his own Diocese,
under Dr. McNamara s treatment, and continues as before.
-
The victim was used--"don't scandalize
the Church" - with the result that victimization is perpetuated again.
-
Fr. Peebles goes on to abuse three more
victims in 1986 under the sponsorship of the Bishop of the Dallas Diocese .
-
Fr. Peebles is never prosecuted.
Back to Top of Report
OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE CASE OF RUDOLPH
KOS
113.
Prior Knowledge:
-
The Diocese had notice that Kos had a sexual
interest in children before he entered the Seminary. No investigation is
conducted.
-
The NCCB, by signing off on Kos annulment,
insured that Kos could enter the Seminary and be eligible for Ordination. It is
for other experts to assess the legality of the annulment but this approval was
a causative factor in Kos becoming a Catholic priest.
-
There was information available from his
brothers and his wife that Kos was a child abuser from an early age, had abused
his own brother and that a pattern of behavior was observed indicating that his
abuse of children was fixated even during marriage. No investigation is
conducted .
-
Complaints of Kos sexual behavior were brought
to the attention of the Vicar General prior to his ordination but the Vicar
General insisted that Kos would nevertheless be ordained. This is typical of the
secret system, in that they know but do not act. No investigation is conducted.
-
Kos actions from the moment he receives a
parish assignment are those of a fixated pedophile and are within the view of
the Chancellor of the Diocese, who raises no complaint. Kos also serves with
Peebles and Hughes in 1982 (receives permission?). No investigation is
conducted.
-
In spite of the fact that Kos questionable
behavior was documented over days and weeks by the pastor of his next assignment
and the assistant pastor at St. John s, those reports were completely ignored
for seven years, from 1985—1992. No investigation is conducted.
-
In spite of these reports, and concrete
evidence of financial irresponsibility, Kos was promoted to pastor in 1989.
-
His pedophilic behavior became the subject of
reports by ‘the new assistant pastor in 1991 but these reports were not
effectively dealt with. Instead, the Diocese referred Kos to a Psychiatrist, Dr.
Jaeckle, who had no experience in treating sexual abusers and the Diocese also
failed to advise the psychiatrist of the preceding behavior and its
documentation.
-
In May of 1992, Kos history is presented to a
psychologist experienced in cases of sexual abuse of minors. Based on this
history, the diagnosis was "classic Pedophile" and recommendation was
to remove and expect complaints .
-
Kos was sent by the Diocese to St. Luke
Institute in June, 1992 but Kos past history was not fully shared with the staff
at St. Luke.
-
Kos was removed only after a victim threatened
litigation in September, 1992 and Kos confessed to some abuse.
-
Kos statement to Dr. Jaeckle, "why are
they harassing me when all these other priests are doing it too?" indicates
the broad knowledge of improper sexual activity within the system.
-
Particularly troubling is the extent to which
the secret system is being preserved by Fr. Kos whereabouts not being known
while substantial personal expenses were being paid. Raises the question of who
is really being protected. Fr. Kos is not the only priest whose location was
unknown during relevant times.
-
The Kos case is a manifestation of the
unraveling of the secret system where the exposure of one priest leads to the
exposure of many more whose activities were known by the system but concealed
from the public.
-
The pattern of concealing the existence of
perpetrators is not only local but national. The rudiments of this system were
first manifested by moving a priest abuser from one parish to another or one
locality to another. (Example: James Porter, where six different Bishops were
ultimately aware of his crimes against children before he was removed from the
priesthood.)
-
As the secret system has unraveled, transfers
were no longer adequate so perpetrators have to be protected through the use and
manipulation of the medical and legal system in more dramatic ways in order to
avoid further scandal.
Back to Top of Report
CONCLUSION
114. I believe that the Bishop of Dallas, and the
bishops of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops/United States Catholic
Conference employed traditional methods of a system of secrecy to conceal
wide—spread evidence of sexual misconduct with minors by Catholic priests and
religious which was known to the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and concealed
from the Catholic public. This concealment included the making of ambiguous,
false, and misleading statements concerning the behavior of Catholic priests and
religious when it was known that a significant number were involved with illegal
sexual misconduct with minors. This illegal misconduct with minors was so
wide—spread and well—known that it resulted in the maintenance of a number
of Catholic therapeutic centers devoted to the treatment of Catholic priests and
religious. The recommendation of a bishop or superior was required for
evaluation or hospitalization, which presumes that superiors had foreknowledge
of the sexual abuse involved in these cases. In fact, the Servants of the
Paraclete opened the first treatment center in the world in 1976 with a program
to treat this very disorder. Yet this material information was not conveyed to
the Catholic public for the safety of Catholic children.
115. The bishops of the Military Vicariate were
also involved in secret system to conceal material information in that they were
a part of the system of assignment of Catholic priests and religious who were
known to engage in sexual misconduct with minors.
116. The Diocese of Dallas concealed information
concerning the propensity of Fathers Peebles and Kos to act out sexually with
minors despite ample notice of this misconduct.
117. Dr. Ray McNamara concealed his dual
relationship with the Dallas Diocese. This relationship appears to have
compromised his judgment with resulting harm to the best interests of John Doe I
in the Peebles case and Jane Doe I in the Hughes case.
118. Dr. McNamara s destruction of the original
treatment record in August, 1993 appears to be an act in furtherance of this
conspiracy to conceal material information regarding the sexual misconduct of
Catholic priests with minors. The Judicial Vicar s letter to an abuse victim in
June, 1993 claiming no knowledge of Fr. "B s" activities also appears
to aid a conspiracy to conceal material information concerning sexual misconduct
of Catholic priests with minors. This was not simply a conspiracy to conceal the
negligence of these defendants but to conceal illegal actions as well in that
many of these crimes against children were never reported to the appropriate
authorities by Dr. McNamara and the representatives of the Diocese of Dallas. I
have not examined the reporting laws in the State of Texas to determine whether
the Diocese of Dallas was a mandated reporter at that time.
I am aware, however, that such reporting laws
require reporting by "any person" and that the sexual abuse of both
girls and boys below the age of 17 was a crime in the state of Texas at the time
that the abuse in these cases occurred. Dr. McNamara seemed obligated to report
Fr. Hughes in September, 1984 and perhaps Fr. Peebles in May of 1984 and August
of 1986. His deposition indicates he did not do so. This behavior furthered the
goals of a cover—up.
119. I will reserve my discussion of the claims
of gross negligence and malice until my final report.
▲
Back to Top of Report