

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE MANUAL

Thomas Doyle, J.C.D.

October 12, 2010

This is a short description of the early days of the clergy sex abuse phenomenon. A central part of the whole story is the written document composed by Ray Mouton, Tom Doyle and Mike Peterson. Although it has a long formal title it has been commonly known as “The Manual.” The following pages recount how the manual came to be.

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The public revelation of extensive sexual abuse of children by Gilbert Gauthé in Louisiana in 1983 and the subsequent revelation of cover-up by the local bishop, Gerard Frey, is generally considered the beginning of the clergy sexual abuse “scandal” of the contemporary era. A key element of the exposure of the systemic pattern of cover-up and the inertia of the hierarchy is a document commonly referred to as “*The Manual*.”

The "manual" was the work of three people: Fr. Michael Peterson, M.D., founder and director of St. Luke Institute, Suitland, Maryland, Mr. F. Ray Mouton, J.D., civil attorney from Lafayette, Louisiana and Fr. Thomas Doyle, J.C.D., secretary-canonist of the Apostolic Delegation, later called the Apostolic Nunciature in Washington D.C. Father Peterson died in April, 1987. My Mouton has retired from the practice of law and is now an author. Father Doyle served as a chaplain in the US Air Force until 2004. He continues to work with sexual abuse victims throughout the United States and in Europe.

The formal name of this document is ***The Problem of Sexual Molestation by Roman Catholic Clergy: Meeting the Problem in a Comprehensive and responsible Manner***. It has always been referred to by the media and others as “The Manual”, the “Doyle-Mouton Report” or the “Mouton-Doyle-Peterson report.”

The “Manual” in its original form consisted of about 100 pages of text prepared by Mouton, Peterson and Doyle. It treated various aspects of the medical, civil law, canon law, insurance and pastoral aspects of the problem. As part of the manual Fr. Peterson included copies of several clinical articles about the nature of pedophilia, its treatment and its curability. Although the manual was originally intended to be confidential, in time it became well known especially to attorneys and the media. It has been widely copied and disseminated around the US and is also in several other countries.

The Manual was not commissioned, assigned or requested by anyone in any position, official or otherwise. It was an entirely private venture, undertaken by the above three, as a response to what they believed was quickly developing into a very serious problem for the Catholic Church. The case of Fr. Gilbert Gauthé of Lafayette LA had become a public issue by the late fall of 1984. Fr. Gauthé was facing serious criminal charges and the bishop of Lafayette

hired Mr. Mouton to act as his defense attorney. A civil suit had already been initiated by one of the families (Glen and Faye Gastal) whose son had been abused by Gauthé. The idea for some sort of written instrument that would assist bishops in their response to individual cases of priest-pedophilia first came into being in Jan. 1985 at a meeting between Tom Doyle, F. Ray Mouton and Fr. Mike Peterson.

The Vatican nuncio, Archbishop Pio Laghi, had been informed by Bishop Frey that he had made a monetary settlement along with a promise of confidentiality with six families whose sons had been sexually molested by Gauthé. Not long after the settlement one family, the Gastal's pulled out of the agreement and engaged an attorney, Minos Simon, of Lafayette. Simon filed a civil suit against the diocese on behalf of the Gastal family. Shortly thereafter Nathan Stansbury, the district attorney, brought criminal charges against Gauthé. The bishop hired Ray Mouton to represent the accused priest. When Doyle learned of the criminal charges he contacted Msgr. Alex Larroque, Vicar General of the diocese and recommended that he contact Fr. Michael Peterson who could help with Gauthé. Larroque contacted Peterson and asked for his assistance. Mouton then contacted Peterson to arrange for a psychological assessment of Gauthé and subsequent treatment.

For the first time, a family was starting a civil suit against a diocese (Gastal v. Lafayette) for failure to take proper precautions when warned about Gauthé. Fr. Gauthé had in fact been reported to the bishop several times since 1972 and before long, it was discovered that he had abused scores of young children, all prepubescent and all boys with the sole exception of one little girl. In the end, he pleaded guilty to 39 counts and was sentenced to twenty years in prison.

Early in January, 1985, Fr. Peterson informed Doyle that Mr. Mouton planned a visit to Washington to discuss Gauthé's situation. The day after Mouton arrived, Fr. Peterson called Doyle and told him that it was urgent that Mouton meet with him. Doyle decided to have the meeting at the Dominican House of Studies rather than at the Nunciature. Although Peterson and Mouton had been in regular contact this was to be the first communication between Mouton and Doyle.

Mouton indicated that there were several other priests in Lafayette who had been involved in sexual abuse of children and that the Diocese was covering them up and thus hurting his chances of a decent defense for Gauthé. He had hoped to reach a plea bargain for Gauthé which would involve transfer to a special secure facility in Maryland where he would receive treatment. This discovery of the other priests would make this plan risky if not unworkable in light of the fact that the District Attorney, Nathan Stansbury, would not be able to treat the case

lightly. In the course of their conversation, Mouton indicated that he knew from confidential sources that there were many other priests around the country who had sexually abused children.

Doyle decided that it was imperative that Archbishop Laghi be apprised of the gravity of the situation. He called the nunciature and arranged for he and Fr. Peterson to meet with the archbishop the next day (Monday). At that meeting Peterson and Doyle related to Archbishop Laghi the information passed to them by Ray Mouton and shared their opinion that unless some decisive action was taken quickly the situation in Lafayette would escalate and become unmanageable. The archbishop then called Archbishop Hannan of New Orleans and informed him that there would be a meeting in the Washington area at which Bishop Frey, Archbishop Hannan, their lawyers, Fr. Peterson and Doyle would be present. The purpose of the meeting was to clarify the issues especially the presence in the diocese of other priests suspected of sexual abuse. The meeting was held on Feb. 8 at the Crystal City Marriott Hotel in Arlington. Present were Archbishop Hannan, Bishop Frey, Msgr. Alex Larroque, Bob Wright and Thomas Reyer as well as Fr. Peterson and Tom Doyle.

Doyle and Peterson facilitated the meeting. They informed all present that they were there at the request of Archbishop Laghi and began by asking for a summary of the present state of affairs in Lafayette. The responses were confusing, inconclusive and unsatisfactory. Peterson then changed the direction of the meeting and asked Bishop Frey what he intended to do about five of the seven priests who had been mentioned by Mouton. The bishop and Larroque were surprised that he knew about them. They responded that they would be taken care of. Doyle then asked about the remaining two priests. Bishop Frey expressed surprise at one of the names and asked Larroque why he had not been informed about him.

As the meeting moved forward Archbishop Hannan insisted that Bishop Frey admit liability on the part of the diocese in order to avoid a trial. He also asked if the bishop had visited with any of the families to which the bishop responded that he had not on advice from the attorney. At that point Archbishop Hannan said emphatically that when similar situations had come up in New Orleans he always went to meet with the families no matter what the lawyers advised.

Subsequent to the meeting, and after conversations with Mouton and Peterson, Doyle suggested to Archbishop Laghi that a bishop be delegated to go to Lafayette to assist in managing the crisis. He suggested that Bishop A.J. Quinn, auxiliary of Cleveland, be selected because of his legal and canonical background. Archbishop Laghi agreed with this suggestion and instructed Doyle to prepare a detailed report that would provide justification for the

appointment. The report consisted of a detailed description of the nature and the extent of the abuse as well as the history of inadequate responses by the bishop. It summarized the volatile situation in the diocese and emphasized that the secular media was paying particular attention to the diocese's actions. Archbishop Laghi agreed that the request should be seen by the pope. He suggested that the report be sent immediately to Cardinal Krol because he was leaving for Rome and would be able to hand it to the pope. The detailed report and the request for the appointment were sent by special courier to Cardinal Krol on a Sunday afternoon in March, 1985. He received it and left for Rome the next evening. He later confirmed that he had spoken of the report to the pope and in his presence handed it to Fr. Dziwiesz. The appointment came through within a matter of days.

Archbishop Laghi called Bishop Quinn to inform him. Doyle called him the same day to work out the logistics of visit to the nunciature. Bishop Quinn came to the nunciature shortly thereafter and was briefed for an entire morning by Fr. Peterson and Doyle. Quinn visited Lafayette shortly thereafter for the first of three or four visits. While there he met with Ray Mouton and with diocesan officials. Rather than provide details of Quinn's involvement at this stage it is better to offer an assessment of his overall effectiveness. In spite of our hopes and the hopes of Archbishop Laghi, Quinn was relatively ineffective, not really contributing anything significant to the solution. Nevertheless Doyle and Mouton continued to have faith in him and continued to work with him.

Doyle, Peterson and Mouton were in daily communication with each other. Mouton was passing along detailed reports of his dealings with the diocese as well as vital information about the impact the whole situation was having in the community. Before long Doyle and Peterson agreed with Mouton's assessment that since the Gauthier case had become public and received so much publicity from coast to coast, the bishop and his staff were no longer capable of effectively managing and containing the growing crisis which was quickly aggravated by reports of sexual abuse by priests in other dioceses. The reports were coming from bishops in neighboring dioceses when families had come forward after seeing the publicity about Gauthier. At the same time a crisis situation had exploded in the diocese of Providence, Rhode Island, at first centering on a priest named O'Connell but quickly spreading to other priests in the area.

We decided on our own, to try and write something to give to the bishops to assist them in dealing with cases that we predicted would start to appear with increasing regularity. We discussed various approaches with different people including several bishops who were receptive to the idea.

We had several conversations with Bishop Quinn and several other bishops. Bishop Quinn suggested that whatever was composed be based on a set of questions that would respond to as many different angles and aspects of the issue as could be conceived of. Within a short time we had decided to collect information and put together a manual or book that would be set up in a question and answer format. The full edition would also contain copies of several medical articles about pedophilia. Most of these were taken from medical journals and several were authored by Dr. Fred Berlin of the Johns Hopkins University Hospital Sexual Disorders Clinic.

Along with the manual, we also proposed that the NCCB sponsor a committee (or project) that would supervise detailed research into the various areas of the problem: civil and criminal law, insurance, canon law, medical and pastoral. The research would be made available to the bishops in order to assist in making enlightened decisions about the problem. The third part of the proposal involved a crisis intervention team which would consist of legal, medical, canonical and pastoral resource persons who would be available to any bishop who requested their services in assisting in dealing with specific cases.

A key aspect of the manual and the proposal included a method of uniform case management or at least case following. By the middle of 1985, there were several civil court actions involving priests and dioceses. There has been no uniform case management or case following by any Church agency. Hence there has been no way of determining the development of civil law jurisprudence, of tracking the nature and amount of settlements, of studying legal strategies and of tracking the number of cases. On the negative side, the lack of case following has given rise to rumor and innuendo about the monies spent, judgments of courts, numbers of perpetrators, dioceses involved etc. The logical agent for case management and case following was the Bishops' Conference. When this was suggested to them they consistently responded that they had no authority to carry out such a project in spite of the fact that they monitored the activities of individual dioceses in a number of other areas.

The original idea for a crisis intervention team was Ray Mouton's (cf. letter of Feb. 22, 1985). The notion of a research committee was essentially Doyle's but quickly concurred with by Mouton and Peterson. The nature of the entire proposal was presented to Archbishop Laghi who agreed with all aspects and promised to help support it.

The idea was to compose a manual containing information about the issue from different approaches: canon law, civil law, criminal law, insurance, pastoral practice, medical. The manual would be given to the NCCB in hopes that they would take some kind of action.

Mouton, Doyle and Peterson were not commissioned to write it and did so entirely on our own with no backing, financial or otherwise, from anyone.

The drafts of the different sections were composed by the three co-authors. In the meantime Doyle was communicating with Archbishop Laghi on a daily basis. He was also in communication with a number of bishops and cardinals about the project. He gained the support of all with whom he discussed the proposal. This support included the manual itself and the critical action aspects of the overall proposal. Conversations with bishops indicated that they were certainly alerted to and worried about the problem. Doyle spoke with one bishop who remarked that any time three or four bishops were engaged in conversation the topic eventually turned to sexual abuse by priests.

Fr. Peterson called Cardinal Krol (Philadelphia) in May to ask for a private meeting. The meeting was arranged and took place in the office of the director of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception in Washington. Just prior to the meeting Doyle had sent the Cardinal a draft copy of several sections of the report. At the meeting, the Cardinal praised the draft sections saying *“if I were to ask someone for a report and a way to tackle this problem, this is exactly what I would expect”*. He promised to speak to Cardinal Law and Bishop Quinn. He subsequently wrote to Doyle on June 11, 13, and 29 about his efforts with bishops in support of the project.

Cardinal Law (Boston) stated that he would get the project into the NCCB by creating a special ad hoc committee that would be an adjunct of the standing committee on Research and Pastoral Practices of which he was the chairman.

Doyle contacted Cardinal Law who agreed that there should be a meeting with the three authors to discuss final implementation of the proposals. The meeting was planned for Chicago for May 15, 1985. The final draft was completed on May 14, 1985 by Mouton and Doyle in Chicago. At the last minute Cardinal Law called Doyle and informed him that he had a conflict that would prevent him from being at the meeting. However he had asked the secretary of his standing committee, Auxiliary Bishop Levada of Los Angeles, to take his place.

Levada arrived in the morning. He met with Doyle, Mouton and Peterson at a Marriott Hotel near O’Hare airport. Part of the agenda involved Mouton meeting alone with Levada to explain details of the crisis intervention team. Levada expressed a very positive reaction to the manual and the proposals. Mouton informed Doyle and Peterson that Levada approved of the

financial portion of the proposal without any reservations. He concluded the meeting by assuring us that he would share his thoughts with Cardinal Law.

About two weeks later Levada called Doyle and stated that the project had been shut down because another committee of the NCCB was going to deal with it and the duplication of efforts would not make the other committee look good. No more was said about the project to Doyle or anyone else. Doyle contacted Cardinal Law for an explanation and was told that the action had been engineered by the conference leadership through the general secretariat. Doyle heard informally that the NCCB Committee on Priestly Life and Ministry would be looking into the issue but never heard or saw anything that actually verified that this committee had done anything.

Nevertheless the three proceeded. Mouton contacted auxiliary bishop Quinn of Cleveland (then an ally) and asked if he would take several copies of the manual and the proposal to the NCCB June meeting in Collegeville MN. The plan was that he would give copies to bishops who he thought would be supportive and helpful. Doyle and Mouton flew to Cleveland and met with Quinn, urging him to do all he could to gain support from the bishops. Although he later claimed he had done this he had in fact done little to encourage the adoption of the manual and the implementation of the action plans.

At the bishops' meeting three presentations were made in an executive session. The presenters were Wilfred Caron (civil law), Bishop Kenneth Angell and Dr. Richard Issel (psychology). The feedback Doyle received from Archbishop Laghi and several bishops was that the psychologist was excellent, the bishop useless and the lawyer mediocre and inconclusive at best. This sentiment was also stated in a letter that Doyle received from Cardinal Krol.

At the conclusion of the meeting Bishop James Malone, president of the conference, announced that a committee had been formed to work on the issue and was headed by now retired Bishop Murphy of Erie PA.

Later in June Doyle went to Pittsburgh to meet with Bishop Anthony Bevilacqua (now retired Cardinal-Archbishop of Philadelphia) who had been one of the major advisors and supporters of the plan. He learned from him that there was actually no committee and that no action was planned. It was merely a PR move with no plans for a follow-up. Doyle later learned that the standing Committee on Priestly life and Ministry was supposed to consider the issue. If it actually did, nothing ever came of the consideration.

At the press conference held by Bishop Malone, he specifically stated that such a committee existed. Yet in a deposition given in 1993, Sr. Sharon Euart, associate secretary general of the NCCB stated that the first committee ever to exist was created by the bishops in 1993. The chairman was Bishop John Kinney.

Nothing was ever said to Peterson, Mouton or Doyle about the fate of the manual. Doyle inquired of several people he knew from the bishops' conference staff and was given a variety of excuses, none of which were credible. The conference claimed that it had no authority to create such a committee nor could it impose anything on individual bishops. They also claimed that they already knew all of the information contained in the manual and had policies and procedures in place. The more common excuse shifted the blame back to Mouton, Doyle and Peterson claiming that they had not followed proper channels in submitting the document and therefore it was never properly considered. This of course was baseless since Doyle had asked for assistance several times and had been told nothing.

The internal procedures of the NCCB were not known to any of the three authors nor did anyone ever suggest which procedures should be followed. In later years, after the manual had been circulated around a great deal and had become well known to attorneys and others involved in the issue, people, especially reporters, would often ask bishops or officials at the NCCB whether they knew about it and if so, why had no action been taken either at the time or since.

The response to inquiries generally came from the office of their general counsel (Mark Chopko). The standard line was that the NCCB already knew everything that was in the manual, had already taken appropriate action and that the idea of a special committee and ad hoc team of experts was not appropriate. Chopko and others who spoke for the conference routinely claimed that that the NCCB could not bind other dioceses to any procedures. They also claimed that the proposals were too costly and that Mouton, Peterson and Doyle were actually trying to sell the plan to the bishops and thus profit from the problem. Chopko and others speaking for the conference also stated that there were problems with the content of the manual although no one ever provided any answers much less straight answers in response to several questions as to the exact nature of these problems.

The officials from the NCCB intentionally misconstrued the authors' motivation and intentions. Mouton and Doyle were convinced that the derogatory comments about the project and its authors was an attempt to shift the responsibility for ignoring the problem from the conference officials to someone else in an effort to conjure up an excuse for their failure to act in the face of explicit warnings about the extent of the problem and its probable consequences.

No one from the conference ever contacted either Mouton or Doyle about the manual or the proposals. The General Secretary spoke with Fr. Peterson on one or two occasions but he reported back to Mouton and Doyle that the conversations were superficial. Peterson flew to Rome in October 1985 with hopes of speaking to officials in the Congregation for Clergy and the Congregation for Religious. He made contacts and had meetings with mid-level officials. Upon his return he told Doyle and Mouton that his efforts had been a waste of time since the Vatican officials he spoke to knew about the problem of sexual molestation by clergy but failed to grasp its very serious nature. Peterson was told that it was an American problem and that the Vatican would do nothing. He also reported back that the officials all voiced concern for the financial ramifications of acknowledging that clergy sex abuse was a problem. Several U.S. bishops had spoken with Vatican personnel about it but their only concerns were possible financial losses.

In December, 1985 a copy of the manual was sent to each diocesan bishop in the US through St. Luke Institute. There was no response from anyone to this gesture. Some bishops, when asked by the press, indicated that they had found it helpful and several years later archbishop Pilarczyk while he was president of the NCCB admitted that they knew of its existence. In spite of this there was never any contact much less collaboration between the Bishops' conference and Mr. Mouton or Doyle. They never received any explanation as to why Cardinal Law's plan for a special sub-committee was scrapped.

In October 1992 Doyle wrote to Archbishop Pilarczyk, then President of the NCCB, about the conference for clergy abuse survivors that had been held by VOCAL/The Linkup in Chicago that month. Archbishop Pilarczyk responded in November. Copies of both letters are appended.

The Bishops' conference discussed the issue at their annual plenary meetings between 1985 and 1993. They have also discussed it annually between 2001 and the present. Between 1985 and 1993 the conference issued at least five statements on the subject and sent several memos from the general counsel to all diocesan bishops.

The early suggestions for a research committee as well as a crisis intervention team never went anywhere. It was not until October 1993 that the NCCB appointed a committee of bishops, headed by Bishop John Kinney of Bismarck, to study the issue. This committee had some meetings and published a three part manual. The USCCB has published *their version* of the history of their involvement on their website. The decision to create a committee was probably motivated by the nationwide publicity given to the discovery of a cover-up of widespread sexual abuse perpetrated by Fr. Jim Porter of Fall River MA. Several of Porter victims joined together

and found him, married and living in Minnesota. They sued the diocese of Fall River and because of their efforts, Porter was extradited, convicted and sentenced to prison where he later died of cancer. The Porter case received extensive coverage which brought significant embarrassment to the Archbishop of Boston, Cardinal Law, and to the U.S. bishops in general.

A few bishops admitted that they used sections of the manual in preparing their own diocesan procedures. In spite of this the authors never received any indication from any bishop or other official source that the manual had been used as such.

Unlike the American bishops, the Canadian hierarchy began taking serious steps to respond to the growing crisis. They had obtained copies of the manual and had used it as a core resource for their own official statement and policy which was published in 1992 under the title *From Pain to Hope*.

A confidential and highly credible source informed Doyle that he had been approached by the late Cardinal Bernardin who asked him to prepare an outline for a way to implement the actions plans contained in the manual. Subsequent to their initial contact Cardinal Bernardin informed this source that he had presented his suggestion to the General Secretary of the Bishops' Conference who told him that the idea was not feasible because the bishops in general would never approve of such a move.

A confirmation of the negative response to the manual and the attached action proposals came later in written form in 1988. Bishop A.J. Quinn wrote to Archbishop Pio Laghi, then Apostolic Nuncio (Vatican ambassador) to the U.S. complaining about various comments Doyle had made to the secular press. In this letter he stated:

“The truth is, Doyle and Mouton want the Church in the United States to purchase their (Doyle’s and Mouton’s) expensive and controvertible leadership in matters relating to pedophilia.”

Archbishop Laghi sent Doyle a copy of Quinn’s letter assured him that he did not agree with Quinn’s accusation. Doyle responded to Archbishop Laghi and also sent a strong letter to Bishop Quinn to which he in turn responded with some lame excuses for his accusations. The basic accusation that Doyle and Mouton hoped to profit from the crisis originated with the General Secretariat of the NCCB/USCC. When asked about the manual by reporters, the Conference General Counsel responded with essentially the same statement as Bishop Quinn.

In 1989 Monsignor Daniel Hoye, then General Secretary of the NCCB, was deposed by plaintiff counsel in a civil suit stemming from the abuse of a woman by a priest named Vance Thorne. In his deposition and in a related affidavit, Monsignor Hoye stated the following:

“The report was neither requested by nor presented to the NCCB/USCC”

“The report gave short shrift to the on-going diocesan and NCCB/USCC efforts at prevention of sexual abuse.”

“A key aspect of the Mouton-Doyle-Peterson report was the proposal that a national ‘team’ at least supplement, but more often displace, diocesan officials in responding to complaints of sexual abuse on a local level.”

“The authors of the report were rather pointed in their dire predictions of the fiscal disaster for the church unless such a team were hired.”

“One of the authors intended to be part of that expert team retained at considerable expense by the NCCB/USCC.”

Bishop Quinn and Monsignor Hoye intentionally lied about the purpose of the report, the aim of the action proposals and the intentions of the authors. The report made no mention, either critical or otherwise, of the efforts of the NCCB/USCC or individual dioceses nor did any of the authors ever mention such in public or private statements. They were unaware of any efforts by the bishops because no one from the conference had ever spoken of them nor had any bishop ever mentioned them. In private conversations Doyle had with several bishops in the late eighties they admitted that they needed direction in dealing with abuse issues but that the conference had nothing to offer them by way of assistance or support in responding to complaints.

Several times Conference spokespersons referred to the Crisis Intervention Team as a “Swat Team” which was an intentional mischaracterization of the proposal. There was never any intent or even discussion that such a team would displace diocesan officials. The team was to have been available for bishops at their request. Its purpose was to visit a diocese and act as a resource for the bishop, not to take over and impose a course of action. It would have no authority from the conference or any other source, would not make decisions or set policy. On two occasions this approach was used at the request of bishops and the results were highly successful.

In drawing up the proposal for the Crisis Intervention Team the authors included a proposed budget which amounted to about three million dollars to fund the team for a period of three years. This figure included the retention of a full-time coordinator for the team, office and

travel expenses as well as projected expenses for the various expert members. Mr. Mouton originally offered to apply for this position. This would have involved a significant financial sacrifice on his part.

In later years when conference officials or bishops were asked about the fate of the manual and the action proposals one of the common responses was the tale that the authors had tried to *sell* the concept to the conference for three million dollars.

The budgetary aspect of the proposal was met with initial approval by those bishops with whom we discussed the idea. It never became a point of contention until the General Secretariat began using it as an excuse for their lack of action and to discredit the manual and the authors. Fr. Peterson and Doyle never envisioned themselves as part of any on-going effort, committee or office nor did they make such proposals to anyone. Mr. Mouton's commitment to the work was not related to obtaining the position of coordinator. He offered himself because of his experience but had no high hopes that he would actually fill such a position.

In 1995, Sr. Sharon Euart, an assistant General Secretary of the NCCB/USCC, was deposed by attorney Sylvia Demarest who asked her specifically about the efforts of the Bishops' Conference. Although certain spokespersons for the conference had referred to "on-going" efforts prior to 1993 and to policies and procedures, Sr. Euart stated under oath that the conference had no committee until 1993 and had basically done nothing apart from those actions evidenced by documents and statements which are on record and which emanated from the conference after 1985.

The proposal that a Crisis Intervention Team, a research committee and an office dedicated to handling the work of the research team was written off by the Conference as is evidenced by Quinn's letter and Hoye's deposition. In 2002 in the wake of the Boston revelations the bishops were forced to take some form of action. Ironically each of the steps initiated at the Dallas meeting was a move they had earlier insisted was beyond their competence. True to form the proposed policies and especially the review board were presented as if they were a revolutionary move originating with the conference.

During their June meeting in Dallas, the bishops may establish a national office to help dioceses around the country deal with cases, one bishop said on Friday. Bishop George Niederauer of Salt Lake City is a member of a committee assigned to come up with standards to present to the bishops in Dallas.

In the course of 2002 several articles appeared in what can best be described as “conservative Catholic” publications. These articles referred to the “manual” and alleged that it actually had another agenda other than that which had been widely understood. The articles claimed that the authors (Doyle, Peterson and Mouton) actually intended to mislead the Catholic Church by proposing that accused priests be turned over to psychologists who claimed to be able to cure the abusing priests but actually knew they could not. Their basic accusation was that the “pedophile” priests were being recycled.

Three examples of such articles are: “*Reflections on the Homosexual Network and the 1985 Clergy Sex Abuse Report*,” by Paul Likoudis, in The Wanderer, an independent weekly, May 30, 2002; “Dr. Judith Reisman...Advises Catholic Church...” by Karl Maurer found (<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/religion/814236/posts>) and “The Sex Abuse Lobby, the Bishops and VOTF” by Fred Martinez, Sept. 22, 2002 on www.newsmax.com. Variations on these articles have appeared on other websites.

The articles are based on writings of Dr. Judith Reisman who has apparently devoted her life to a critical study of the work and methods of Dr. Alfred Kinsey. She alleges that Fr. Michael Peterson was a disciple of Kinsey. This illogical conclusion was derived from her supposition that since Peterson was a colleague of and voiced respect for Dr. Fred Berlin and Dr. John Money he therefore was a “Kinseyite”. Berlin and Money had been directly involved with the Sexual Dysfunction Clinic at Johns Hopkins University. Reisman, herself not a clinician but with a Ph.D. in communications, claims that Berlin and Money are Kinsey disciples whose primary agenda is putting sexual abusers back on the street and promoting the so-called “homosexual agenda.”

Reisman, and those who support her claim that the “Manual” was actually intended to support this nebulous “homosexual agenda.” Their articles contain numerous inaccuracies, untruths and slanderous statements about Drs. Berlin, Money and Peterson. For example, the Wanderer article claimed that Fr. Peterson at one time ran a sex change clinic in San Francisco. They also picked up on a statement in the “Manual” that “the Catholic Church has to get away from extreme moral judgementalism” in regard to sex. Neither Reisman nor the authors of the articles understood the intent of the “manual” nor did any of them have even a superficial knowledge of traditional moral theology. They failed to understand the clinical considerations and erroneously asserted that Drs. Berlin, Money and Peterson believed that true pedophiles can be cured. Fortunately Dr. Reisman's allegations and those of those of the people who bought her ideas, are taken seriously by only a few and those few are limited to the extreme “right” (for lack of a better term) who are morbidly obsessed with sex in any form.

The issue of the confidentiality of the document has also been widely misunderstood. At no time did the authors ever intend the document to serve as a blueprint or instruction guide on ways to conceal evidence of sexual abuse by the clergy. At the time of its composition, the three authors fully intended to work within the structures of the institutional church and in full cooperation with the bishops. They firmly believed that once the bishops were aware of the gravity of the issue and the potential for a dramatic increase in both cases and public awareness, they would take every necessary step to *first*, reach out to the victims with care and compassion, *second*, remove all perpetrating clerics from ministry and offer them the very best therapeutic help available, *third*, create policies and procedures that would effectively cause the first two goals to happen and *fourth* be completely open and honest with the secular media and with the Catholic and non-Catholic public.

The authors realized that the situation in spring of 1985 was delicate. They believed the Church would be best served if the bishops could discuss the issue at the June meeting in complete freedom and without any media attention. They were painfully aware of the intense publicity surrounding the Gauthé case and sought to suggest measures that would avoid any undue publicity. They did not believe that the majority of bishops would avoid dealing with the problem in a direct manner, choosing secrecy and cover-up instead. Similarly they believed the Bishops' Conference would use its power and resources to bring about the necessary changes in policy and practice. Consequently, with Mr. Mouton as the prime mover on this aspect of their efforts, they urged that the manual be kept confidential until after the bishops' meeting had taken place and after the committee had been established.

It has also been suggested that the authors sought to provide the bishops with ways of hiding or expunging files. They urged that bishops look at their personnel files and separate out documents that contained delicate information for storage in separate files. They did so in light of their prediction that discovery orders would result in the disclosure of all clergy personnel files. They saw no reason to have information about clerics who had not been accused nor otherwise involved in any way, publicly disclosed even if inadvertently.

The "manual" continues to occupy a prominent place in the unfolding history of the contemporary clergy abuse saga. Looking back over the past 26 years it is safe to say that the authors had only vague expectations of what the future held. At first they sincerely believed the "crisis" would be short lived. Before the decade ended however, Mr. Mouton's astute assessment that the initial cases of clergy sex abuse actually revealed an entire culture that both nurtured the abusers and protected them after they were discovered.

The first clear indications of an organized cover-up came in 1985 and were quickly confirmed by the responses of the various bishops who were at the center of the power structure of the U.S. Church.

People today are often surprised and even shocked when they learn that Cardinals Law, Bevilacqua and Krol were central figures in supporting the creation of the manual and its attached proposals. Much later their conduct in dealing with individual cases was diametrically opposite of their actions at the outset of the “crisis.” One can only speculate as to the reasons for the dissonance. Perhaps the best explanation is the fact that these cardinals and other bishops who were initially supportive saw the problem in a radically different light when they were confronted with accusations in their own dioceses. Sexual molestation of minors then became much more than a generalized, distant challenge. When confronted with a threat to their power and image they easily chose their own welfare over that of the victims.

The Gauthé case received nationwide publicity and is generally considered the beginning of what is commonly but inaccurately referred to as the “Clergy Abuse Crisis.” The first case in the U.S. was one initiated by Jeff Anderson in 1983. He filed a formal complaint against the archdiocese of St. Paul and the Diocese of Winona based on the cover-up and mishandling of numerous reports of sexual abuse of minor boys by former Fr. Tom Adamson. The first case against Adamson was filed in 1983 but the first trial did not take place until 1989.

The Gauthé and Adamson cases were not the starting point of a crisis. They were the catalysts for the revelation of a side of the clerical culture that had always remained deeply buried, its existence beyond the imagination of most Catholics. What began as a series of disjointed actions by a variety of players in the first half of the eighties ended up being a phenomenon that would alter the history of the Catholic Church worldwide and permanently change the place of institutional Catholicism in the modern world.

Text of a letter sent to Archbishop Pilaczyk, President of the Bishop's Conference, after the first LinkUp convocation in 1992.

**The Rev. Thomas P. Doyle, O.P., J.C.D.
Box 485, 227 N. Elm Street
Bunker Hill, Indiana 46914**

October 22, 1992

**The Most Reverend Daniel Pilarczyk,
President, NCCB/USCC,
100 East 8th Street,
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202**

Dear Archbishop Pilarczyk,

This past weekend, October 16-18, an organization called VOCAL held its first conference in Arlington Heights, IL, a suburb of Chicago. VOCAL stands for Victims of Clergy Abuse Linkup and is an organization of and for the victims of sexual abuse by the clergy. Its membership includes victims, their families and supporters. Although it is nondenominational, the vast majority of the membership is Catholic.

Although the conference was well publicized and open to anyone, it is unfortunate that no member of the hierarchy was present nor any member of any diocesan administration, including the archdiocese of Chicago. There were only five priests in attendance. I say unfortunate, because in light of statements made by some bishops, including Cardinal Bernardin about the seriousness of the problem and the need to not only learn more about it but extend sensitivity to victims, this would have been an ideal opportunity to hear first-hand what hundreds of people have experienced through this terrible problem.

I found the conference very enlightening and would like to share with you some observations on the weekend. Besides myself as one of the featured speakers, other main speakers included the founder, Jeanne Miller, the mother of a victim, Jason Berry, author of the book Lead Us Not Into Temptation, Dr. AW Richard Sipe, Dr. James Cavanaugh, director of the Isaac Ray Center, Chicago, Jeffrey Anderson, attorney, Rev. Marie Fortune

and Fr. Andrew Greeley. The conference was attended by several hundred people from throughout the United States and Canada. I am enclosing a copy of the program. There was also extensive press coverage, both newspaper and television, from throughout the United States.

Many people told their stories both publicly and privately. All were shocking and some were outright disgusting. There was a general feeling of anger among those in attendance. The anger was directed, naturally, at the clergy who had abused people. This was secondary however, because the brunt of the anger was directed toward the hierarchy and other church administrators to whom victims and their families had turned for help.

The purpose of the conference was to present an opportunity for victims to gather together for mutual support and assistance. The primary purpose however, was to explore ways of convincing the authorities of the institutional church ... the bishops ... that this is indeed a serious problem that needs to be addressed not with rhetoric but with responsible action.

Those in attendance including the speakers expressed a great deal of anger and frustration with the Bishops' Conference and with individual bishops for their collective inaction to this issue. There were many, many stories from victims and their families of attempts to get action from their bishops. These attempts were met with lies, denial, harassment, and lack of action and in some cases, even lawsuits for defamation of character of the accused priest. I even heard stories of people who approached dioceses with set policies and procedures who discovered that these procedures were on paper only.

The NCC13 has stated its concern for this issue but has basically done nothing save a couple of statements issued by the general counsel. Frankly, the people directly involved with the problem of sexual abuse by priests do not hold out any hope that the conference will ever do anything effective. As one speaker put it so well, "concern for the victims of sex abuse by priests is not on the agenda of politically correct items for the bishops." The statements from the conference to the effect that this is a local problem and not within the competence of the NCCB have little meaning in light of the fact that the conference has issued pastoral statements and letters on everything from nuclear arms to migrant workers.

Many bishops have spoken eloquently of their concern for this grave problem but very few have backed up their words with effective and consistent action. This is not simply my opinion but the experience of hundreds of victims and their families. Had there been

responsible action in the face of complaints, the millions of dollars paid out and the many lawsuits could well have been avoided.

The general feeling of frustration is coupled with the conviction that it is useless to wait for the church's leadership to do anything. Hundreds of people have been harmed beyond description by the fact of sexual abuse by priests and the shabby treatment accorded by the church leadership. Many have not lost their faith in God but have certainly lost their faith in the institutional church.

Eight years have passed since this issue became a public matter, with the infamous case of Gilbert Gauthe in Lafayette. I have been directly involved since that time, hoping that the church as an institution would do something. It has done little if anything and I for one have given up hope that there ever will be any action.

I am writing simply to share some information on the conference as well as the feelings and opinions of hundreds of people involved in the issue.

Sincerely in Christ,

Thomas P. Doyle, O.P., J.C.D.

Archbishop Pilarczyk's response.

November 18, 1992

**The Reverend Thomas P. Doyle, O.P., J.C.D.
Box 485
227 N. Elm Street
Bunker Hill, IN 46914**

Dear Fr. Doyle:

I am responding to your letter of October 22 reflecting upon the recent conference conduct by the Victims of Clergy Abuse Linkup (VOCAL). I understand that there is a great deal of anger, some of which may be justified, about the way that some diocesan bishops may have responded to the question of sexual abuse committed by Catholic priests. Your concern seems to be that the NCCB systematically ignores the problem and that individual bishops have shown little inclination to deal in a realistic way with this difficult and traumatic situation. We bishops have heard again in our recent meeting the pain and the anxiety of the victims of abuse, heard a report by Cardinal Mahony on his meeting with victims, and responded in a tangible way

In 1985 the President of the NCCB, Bishop Malone, received a copy of the report that you prepared with Fr. Peterson and Mr. Mouton commenting on what you saw at the time as a growing crisis of some proportion for the Catholic Church in this country. You assumed, at the time and subsequently, that the bishops were both unaware of the situation and unresponsive. Although there may be some disagreement about the specific way in which the NCCB responded to the matter, the fact remains that your report presented no new issue (of which the NCCB was unaware) or presented information that required some materially different response. You know, from your canonical training, that the NCCB does not have the power to bind individual Bishops in matter of priestly discipline. We can only suggest and advise. In these cases, our staff consistently advised dioceses on how best to handle the situation relating to the sexual abuse of children by clergy. Those principles are laid out in my public statement after the June, 1992, Bishops' meeting in South Bend, Indiana. A copy of that statement (enclosed) reaffirms what has been our view all along: this is a tragedy of immense proportion for all institutions in this society which are concerned with the welfare of children. The problem of the sexual abuse of children is no

more extensive in Catholic institutions than in any other institutions in our culture. The best way to respond to this situation is to deal with it openly and effectively, by those closest (not farthest) from the pastoral situation in the parish and diocese.

We bishops have been greatly pained by the problem of sexual abuse of children, whether committed by clergy or anyone else. As shown in our recent meeting, it has never been our intention either to hide the problem or to walk away from the problem. Nonetheless, in the face of sometime conflicting advice about how best to deal with it from a series of well-meaning advisers and critics, some of us may have not moved quickly enough or openly enough, as others would have liked, in dealing with this situation. Consequently, ill motives have been attributed to us that are both unfair and untrue.

Finally, we know that the victims of sexual abuse, whether committed by clergy or *anyone else*, need an opportunity to express themselves to each other, to professionals, and to society at large. We have much to learn as a society from *listening to* these stories and hearing this pain relayed sometimes 20, 30, or 40 or more years after the fact. We hope, however, that the victims are willing also to hear our pain. People need to recognize that their bishops and others who administer this Church are as hurt and angry as they are that this tragedy could have happened.

I hope that, as you reflect on these words, you will recognize that the Conference has attempted to deal responsibly with this tragedy. It has attempted to do so by bringing together leaders and experts, by helping those who must deal with this situation to do so with the best available information and advice. We have helped dioceses draft policies and to put them into effect. We have undertaken training. Most of all, we encourage each other's best pastoral instincts--to reach out to prevent abuse, heal pain, and reconcile division. Rather than look to the past and lament what more might or could have been done, it is best to look to the future and invest our energy and resources to break the cycle of abuse.

I would like to hope that we can count on your expertise and cooperation in dealing with this problem.

Sincerely,

Most Reverend Daniel E. Pilarczyk
President, NCCB/USCC
Archbishop of Cincinnati